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Foreign-owned firms from advanced countries carry the culture of transparency in business transactions
that is orthogonal to the culture of hiding and insider dealing in many developing economies and economies
in transition. In this paper, we document this using administrative data on reported earnings and market
values of cars owned by workers employed in foreign-owned and domestic firms in Moscow, Russia.
We examine whether closer ties to foreign corporations result in the diffusion of transparency to private
Russian firms. We find that Russian firms initially founded in partnerships with foreign corporations
are twice as transparent in reported earnings of their workers as other Russian firms, but they are still
less than half as transparent as foreign firms themselves. We also find that increased links to foreign
corporations, such as hiring more workers from them, raise the transparency of domestic firms. An
important channel for this transmission appears to be the need to keep official wages and salaries of
incumbent workers close to wages domestic firms have to pay to their newly hired workers with experience
in multinationals.
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The role of foreign capital in promoting economic transformation in developing countries 
and countries in transition has received a lot of attention in the literature.  So far this 
attention,  however,  has  almost  entirely  been  limited  to  its  role  in  the  diffusion  of 
knowledge (Branstetter [2006], Keller and Yeaple [2009]) and/or the transfer of more 
efficient managerial practices (Bloom et al. [2010, 2011], Görg et al. [2007], Sabirianova 
Peter et al. [2005]).  Another and potentially even more important role of foreign capital 
is in creating and transmitting a culture of transparency in economic transactions. 
Imagine being approached by someone who has a mutually beneficial business 
proposal that looks really attractive.  The only problem is that the potential partner insists 
that everything is based on “a handshake,” with no formal written arrangements, money 
changing hands in cash, and no paper traces left of any transactions.  If your economic 
culture is rooted in a Western-type economy you will probably walk away from such a 
proposal.  But it comes as the most natural way of doing business for economic agents 
whose culture is rooted in decades of hiding all that can possibly be hidden from the 
government’s “grabbing hand” (Shleifer and Vishny [1998]). 
  The most damaging aspect of the culture of hiding from an economic point of 
view is that even though private benefits may outweigh private costs, hiding entails large 
efficiency costs for the market overall, such as market segmentation, high transaction 
costs  of  doing  business  outside  of  a  narrow  range  of  trusted  partners,  limited 
opportunities for outside investment, etc. (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny [1997], Braguinsky 
[1999], Braguinsky and Myerson [2004]).  If the activity of multinational corporations 
can somehow help transform the local corporate culture towards more transparency of 
business  transactions,  this  would  imply  a  major  role  of  foreign  capital  in  fostering 
economic efficiency in developing countries and countries in transition. 
In  this  paper  we  address  this  question  by  using  a  unique  dataset  available  in 
Moscow, the capital city of Russia and the center of its economic life.  The culture of 
hiding in which most Russian firms operate has been documented through survey data 
and anecdotal evidence in several past studies (e.g., Johnson et al. [2000], Yakovlev 
[2001]) as well as in our own recent study (Braguinsky, Mityakov, and Liscovich [2010], 
hereafter BML).  The first thing we do in the current paper is to confirm the conjecture   3 
about much higher transparency of wages and salaries paid by multinationals. We find 
that the employees’ earnings reported by foreign-owned firms are on average four times 
higher  than  in  domestic  firms  for  the  same  car  values,  controlling  for  various  other 
characteristics such as firm size and sector of economic activity as well as individual 
characteristics. 
The fact that foreign-owned firms are much more transparent in labor contracts 
than domestic companies has important implications in its own right.  In particular, it 
indicates that conventional measures of the labor productivity gap between multinationals 
and local companies (which inevitably rely on reported output per worker or reported 
wages)  should  be  taken  with  a  grain  of  salt.    It  seems  that  a  lion’s  share  of  actual 
employee compensation in domestic firms is paid outside of the formal reporting system 
(“black” as opposed to “white” wages, to use the term widely employed among Russian 
workers themselves).
1  
While the immediate role of multinationals in increasing labor productivity may 
thus be less than measured by conventional methodology, they may nevertheless play an 
important  (and  so  far  understudied)  role  in  improving  the  overall  efficiency  of  the 
economy if they can spread the culture of transparency to domestic firms.  Our data allow 
us to examine whether links to multinationals do indeed have this effect. 
To address this question, we first identify in the data private Russian companies 
with  a  non-zero  fraction  of  workers  with  experience  in  multinationals  (hereafter, 
“foreign-related firms,” FRF).  Our estimates, controlling for employer-individual-level 
fixed effects, indicate that the impact of hiring more workers from the multinationals on 
transparency of other workers in FRF is positive and significant both statistically and 
economically.  An increase in the fraction of workers hired from multinationals by one 
standard deviation is associated with 20 percent increase in transparency among workers 
who stayed employed in private domestic companies.  Notably, we find no such effects 
for employees of state-owned establishments.  
                                                        
1 Such payments are often supplemented by employees stealing from the firms they work for; and the (net 
of  costs)  value  of  stolen  goods,  services  and  working  time  should  be  included  in  total  employee 
compensation to make efficiency comparisons meaningful.  Our methodology allows us to capture both of 
the above sources of unreported compensation.  We benefited from discussions with Nicholas Bloom.   4 
To better understand the mechanism that could account for these patterns, we 
collected the data on founding backgrounds and subsequent company histories for a large 
sample of FRF from their websites and other sources.  One of the most striking findings 
is that Russian private firms that were founded in partnership with foreign-owned firms
2 
offer about twice as transparent labor contracts as other FRF, even when controlling for 
the  fraction  of  workers  with  experience  in  multinationals.    They  thus  locate  almost 
exactly “in-between” the two opposite corporate cultures.  By the time our data coverage 
starts, most of these firms had long outgrown their initial stage and were owned and 
operated  entirely  by  their  Russian  owners,  while  producing  and  selling  their  own 
products and services instead of just acting as distributors.  Nevertheless, the high impact 
of “cultural influence” from multinationals experienced at the time they were founded is 
very clearly detectable in the data. 
Apart from direct influence as in cases above, we tried to look for a mechanism 
that could make domestic companies more transparent when they increase hiring from 
multinationals.  One possible channel is “vertical spillovers,” where business practices of 
companies change with changes in top managerial personnel (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 
[2003]).  This conjecture led us to look for changes in transparency that might be driven 
by hiring high-ranking employees and managers from foreign-owned firms but we did 
not find much empirical support for this hypothesis, at least in the overall data. 
Instead, we find empirical patterns that can be described as “horizontal” spillovers 
of transparency.  The transparency increase is larger for employees who are closer to 
newly hired workers from multinationals in the job quality space.  We hypothesize that to 
prevent disruption in the workplace, domestic firms might engage in “benchmarking” of 
earnings of incumbent employees to the earnings they have to pay to workers recruited 
from multinationals.  Interestingly, we do not find support in the data for the conjecture 
that most workers moving from multinationals to domestic firms are more reluctant to 
accept employment contracts with a large fraction of “black wages,” although we do find 
some support for this in employers with the closest ties to multinationals. 
                                                        
2 Such  as  joint  ventures  with  foreign  investors  holding  a  minority  share,  or  authorized  distributors  of 
foreign producers.   5 
Our  paper  is  related  to  several  strands  in  the  literature.    The  development 
economics literature investigated the impact of foreign direct investment on economic 
performance of companies in recipient countries.  Existing attempts to assess this impact 
came up with mixed results: Aitken and Harrison [1999] and Smarzynska [2004] present 
evidence of positive spillovers from foreign firms presence in the industry, while Aitken, 
Harrison, and Lipsey [1996] find no or even negative effects.  More recently, availability 
of employee-employer matched studies allowed for more detailed analysis through the 
channel of labor mobility; see, e.g., Gorg and Strobl [2004], and Balsvik [2011]. 
Our paper follows this empirical approach.  However, our conceptual focus is 
complementary  to  the  existing  literature.    Rather  than  trying  to  estimate  productivity 
spillovers  from  foreign  firms’  presence  in  the  industry  we  focus  on  the  role  of 
multinationals in spreading the corporate culture of transparency, which affects reported 
earnings.    We  argue  that  without  distinguishing  between  reported  vs.  true  earnings 
comparing wages in domestic and foreign firms is likely to be misleading. 
Our  paper also  contributes  to  the  growing literature  on  the  shadow  or  hidden 
economies (see Schneider and Enste [2000] for a survey).  Most of the papers in this field 
rely  on  indirect  aggregate  indicators  like  electricity  consumption  (Alexeev  and  Pyle 
[2003]), share of cash in transactions (Tanzi [1983]), or on survey data with self-reported 
consumption and incomes (Pissarides and Weber [1989], Gorodnichenko et al [2009]).
3 
Our approach which employs administrative records allows us to obtain more precise and 
disaggregated estimates of hiding and its determinants. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.    In  Section  II  we  present  an 
overview of the system of hidden earnings in the Russian economy and briefly discuss 
some of the previous findings in the literature.  In Section III we describe the data and the 
construction of our sample.  We also lay out the empirical model used in our estimations.  
Section IV presents our findings concerning relative transparency of multinationals and 
domestic  Russian  firms  and  also  how  close  ties  to  multinationals  play  out  in  the 
transmission of transparency culture from multinationals to domestic firms.  Section V 
examines possible mechanisms for such transmission and also contains some robustness 
checks.  Section VI concludes. 
                                                        
3  See Hanlon et al. [2007] and DeBacker et al. [2011] for notable exceptions.   6 
II. Hidden Earnings and Multinationals: an Overview 
Most hidden earnings in Russian companies appear to be “black wages,” which 
are either envelopes with actual cash handed to workers by the management or more 
elaborate schemes, where compensation is disguised as, for instance, an insurance policy 
or a foreign exchange transaction on which the employer deliberately takes a loss.
4  Firms 
benefit because they evade the payroll tax, as well as the sales tax (in case of unregistered 
cash  transactions)  or  the  profit  tax  (when  “black  wages”  are  disguised  as  losses  on 
investment).  “Black” wages can also be used by the management to reward or punish 
employees with impunity from labor regulations and laws.  The system of “black wages” 
is thus part of the peculiar culture of cronyism and power harassment in the workplace, 
arguably inherited from the final decades of the decaying Soviet economy. 
An important part of hidden earnings also appears to be comprised of employer-
tolerated theft.  The Soviet Union in its heyday would literally execute an individual who 
stole just a handful of potatoes from the “collective” field.  In the Soviet Union during its 
final  years,  the  “parallel  economy”  dealers  were  stealing  with  impunity  whole  cargo 
trains whose movements were supposedly monitored at the Politburo level (Vaksberg 
[1992], Braguinsky and Yavlilnsky [2000]), and ordinary workers were not far behind.  A 
bartender would steal liquor, a butcher would steal meat, etc.  The culture of stealing was 
not limited to the trade and services sector (although it was certainly relatively more 
prevalent there) but was also common in manufacturing firms (where employees would 
steal raw materials or use their workplaces for side jobs), transportation services (where a 
taxi driver would take a client without turning on the meter), and so on. 
This culture of stealing was carried over to the post-communist economy where 
many new owners, even in genuinely private firms, were by and large either incapable or 
unwilling to change it.  Instead, the value of stolen goods, utilities and time at work is 
implicitly included into the labor contracts, thus reducing the official compensation firms 
                                                        
4 Even a casual web search comes up with at least a dozen sites that openly discuss the costs and benefits of 
“white” versus “black” wages from the employers’ and employees’ perspective, compare various schemes 
employed  by  firms,  etc.,  e.g.,  http://mirsovetov.ru/a/miscellaneous/employment/salary-black-white.html, 
http://trudprava.ru/index.php?id=1423.  For a good source in English see Yakovlev [2001].  See also BML, 
Appendix 8.   7 
have to pay to their employees.  And, just as with “black wages,” employer-tolerated 
theft also gives a lot of discretionary powers to managers over their workers (you behave 
and  I  will  look  the  other  way,  you  don't  behave  and  I  will  have  you  arrested  and 
prosecuted).
5 
Even though the system of “black wages” (explicit or implicit) as described above 
is clearly inefficient, once the culture that accepts it is firmly entrenched, it becomes hard 
to dislodge.  From a worker’s perspective, the benefit of a non-transparent labor contract 
with  a  large  “black”  component  or  implicitly  tolerated  workplace  theft  is,  first  and 
foremost, saving on the personal income tax and also on the part of the payroll tax that 
would otherwise be shifted to wages.  Just as in “corruption with theft” (Shleifer and 
Vishny [1993]) the system aligns the interests of the worker and the employer, with the 
loser being the state (and overall economic efficiency).  The main individual cost of 
“black wages,” on the other hand, at least in an environment where this culture is well 
entrenched and the risk of prosecution is very low, would be of a psychological nature, 
especially high for those who want to be law-abiding citizens or for those who have low 
tolerance for arbitrary behavior by the management.
6  
The corporate culture brought into Russia by foreign capital is orthogonal to the 
above.  First, foreign-owned firms come from an environment where transparent labor 
contracts are the norm and “black wages” are generally balked at by both employers and 
employees.    Even  though  some  foreign-owned  firms  may  actually  be  not  averse  to 
playing by the prevailing rules of the game in their destination countries (there is both 
anecdotal evidence and evidence in our data that some foreign-owned firms do pay at 
least some part of compensation in unregistered cash), their ability to embrace those rules 
is still severely limited.  Foreign-owned firms, especially large multinational corporations, 
                                                        
5 While many explanations were advanced for the fate suffered by the former richest man in Russia Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky (who has been in jail since 2003), we find the explanation along the lines above to be the 
most likely one.  Khodorkovsky was probably guilty of at least some of theft and tax evasion charges he 
was convicted on, but so were many other “oligarchs” who have not suffered his fate. The difference seems 
to be that Khodorkovsky did not “behave.”  Thus, the culture we are talking about is truly ubiquitous in 
Russia even today, going all the way to the highest echelons of the hierarchy. 
6 There is also the cost of forgoing employers’ contributions to the social security fund, which will be felt 
more by older workers who are closer to retirement.    8 
must be conscious of their reputation, both in their home countries and world-wide.  They 
can  also  be  subject  to  litigation  and  punitive  sanctions  in  their  home  countries  for 
breaking the laws in other countries and they commonly lack the necessary connections 
to escape the scrutiny of the Russian tax authorities.  On top of that, few if any managers 
of multinational corporations are likely to tolerate employee theft.  In efficient labor 
markets, this means that the “white wages” they have to pay to their employees have to 
be much higher than the “white” component of wages paid by their domestic counterparts. 
The presence of multinationals expands the menu of choices available to workers 
in the domestic economy.  In the absence of an alternative system, there might be no 
chance for workers whose personal costs of non-transparent labor contracts are high to 
change  the  environment  without  suffering  serious  economic  penalties.    For  example, 
refusing to accept “black cash” will result not only in forgoing a large part of the actual 
compensation but may very well result in losing the job itself, and the same is true about 
refusing to steal while working for an employer where everybody else is stealing. 
If, however, foreign-owned firms just play the role of offering a more palatable 
type of employment and rewards to workers with intrinsic preferences for transparency, 
their  role  in  changing  the  overall  corporate  culture  in  the  recipient  economy  will  be 
limited.  Multinationals will in this case simply be small islands of higher transparency 
(and higher efficiency) amidst the sea of other firms with low efficiency and widespread 
“black wages.”  Such islands will help workers who gain access to them to acquire better 
skills, and will contribute to both their material and psychological well-being, but they 
will not make much of a difference in how the majority of the domestic workforce goes 
around doing their business.  After all, the fraction of genuinely foreign-owned firms in 
total employment in our data for the Russian capital city of Moscow is less than 2 percent.  
To have a real impact on the recipient economy as a whole, more transparent culture of 
multinationals should be somehow transmitted to domestic firms.  Of course, the same is 
also true of technology diffusion and the spread of better management practices.   
One possibility that we entertain in this paper is that experience of working for a 
multinational  may  lead  some  workers  to  at  least  partially  acquire  the  culture  of 
transparency which they then carry over to domestic firms when they move into them.  
Of course, it is also possible that those who quit the foreign sector do so (or are fired)   9 
because they failed to embrace the culture of transparency.  We spend a lot of effort to 
tease out these possibilities in the data and overall it seems that the prevailing culture of 
hiding in domestic firms wins, in the sense that workers who move from multinationals to 
domestic  firms  are  less  transparent  than  other  multinational  employees  even  while 
working  for  multinationals.  They  become  all  but  indistinguishable  in  terms  of  the 
transparency of their wages and salaries from the rest of the domestic workforce right 
after the move.   
We do find, however, rather strong evidence that serious ties to multinationals 
(such as working with foreign capital at the time the firm was founded, or an increase in 
the number of workers hired from multinationals) positively affect the transparency of 
domestic firms that enter into such ties.  This provides us with some hope that more 
penetration  of  foreign  capital  and  closer  links  between  foreign-owned  and  domestic 
businesses may over time change the situation for the better.  
III. Data and Empirical Methodology 
3.1. Data Sources and Sample Construction 
Our data come from two main sources.  The first is five administrative databases 
of incomes between 1999 and 2003.  The databases, which contain information allowing 
us to identify both income sources (employers) and income recipients (individuals), are 
official  records  of  all  payments  and  withheld  taxes  generated  by  all  income  sources 
registered in Moscow.
7  As is usual with administrative data, parts of the data were of 
poor  quality  and  had  to  be  eliminated.    Specifically,  we  eliminated  cases  where 
individuals’ names contained abbreviations, obvious typos or non-alphabetic characters, 
and the data where we did not have information on dates of birth or addresses.  We also 
dropped all observations on individuals who appeared to be present more than once in the 
                                                        
7 These databases somehow became publicly available in the mid-2000s and have been reproduced and 
distributed on CDs as well as over the internet, presumably targeting demand from marketing agencies.  
Several previous studies employed these data, stripping them of all individual identifying information to 
protect privacy, for research purposes (Guriev and Rachinsky [2006], Braguinsky et al. [2010]) and we 
follow this practice here.  The 2004 database is also available but we did not use it because the spread of 
consumer credit that started in Moscow in that year might compromise our identification strategy.   10 
income database in a given year.  Random testing revealed that in about 10 percent of 
such cases, the second, third and so on entries were exact duplicates of the first one 
(sometimes with a trivial correction of a typo), so including those would have resulted in 
counting incomes of such individuals more than once.  This procedure also eliminated 
individuals with multiple income sources in a given year, which could have complicated 
the interpretation of our estimates as explained below.  
The total number of observations for five years of administrative income data we 
were left with after the above procedure was 26,889,790 (4,329,337 in 1999, 5,790,422 in 
2000, 5,946,298 in 2001, 4,592,606 in 2002 and 6,231,127 in 2003).  This corresponds to 
about  60  percent  of  all  raw  entries  contained  in  the  five  databases.    We  then  used 
individual-identifying information contained in the data to match the same individuals 
across  income  databases  in  different  years.    We  were  able  to  match  19,201,689 
observations as pertaining to the same individual in at least two different years.  For the 
remaining 7,688,101 observations (about 29 percent of the total) we were not able to 
obtain repeated observations in different years, so we treat them as separate individuals 
present in the income databases in only one year and employ them for cross-section 
analyses only.  Appendix 1 explains the steps used in the matching procedure and also 
provides more details about the number of individuals matched across various years. 
Our second source of the data is the 2005 auto registration database, which is a 
snapshot of cars and their owners as of April of that year that also contains full vehicle 
histories.  We used the vehicle identification number (VIN) to trace its history of owners.  
We eliminated all vehicles owned not by individuals but by legal entities, as well as 
trucks, mini-buses, motorcycles and other non-passenger cars (even if registered in the 
names of individual owners).  We then used the information about the make, model and 
year to impute the market value of the car in a given year according to a standardized 
procedure, described in Appendix 2. 
Individual identifying information contained in the auto registration database was 
used  to  match  car  owners  to  their  income  and  tax  records  in  the  income  databases 
described above.  We were able to match 2,913,359 individuals who owned at least one 
car in 2005 to their corresponding entries in at least one of the income databases above.  
693,366 (23.8 percent) of them owned cars with missing information about the vehicle’s   11 
VIN, making it impossible to trace their history of ownership.  We elected to eliminate 
such car owners as well as all cars with missing VINs from our analysis.
8  We also 
dropped the bottom 20 percent of observations with the lowest market value of the cars 
(about $1,200 or less) out of concern that such old and highly depreciated cars could not 
serve as a proxy for true earnings for the period in our data.  We experimented with other 
reasonable cutoffs and the estimation results were similar. 
To address the issues of corporate culture we needed to classify employers by 
ownership  and  sector  of  activity.    The  total  number  of  Moscow  legal  entities  in  our 
sample containing matched car ownership-incomes data is 190,965.  Unfortunately, we 
could not rely on an automated procedure to assign ownership and sector to most of them.  
One especially serious problem from the perspective of this study is that many firms that 
are officially registered as foreign-owned are actually firms owned by Russian capital 
through  paper  offshore  companies.    These  needed  to  be  separated  from  legitimate 
foreign-owned firms, and the only way to do it was to examine each potential foreign-
owned entity manually.  Furthermore, it is well known that a large number of firms 
registered in Moscow are shell paper companies created (and dissolved shortly after) for 
the  sole  purpose  of  money  laundering.    Not  only  will  such  firms  not  be  producing 
anything for the market, they will often have no one actually employed in them, instead 
using stolen or borrowed identities for registration purposes.
9  If too many of those paper 
companies found their way into our sample, any comparisons between the transparency 
of multinationals and Russian firms could be seriously compromised. 
We  therefore  elected  to  start  our  analysis  with  13,263  income-generating 
employers (legal entities) that we had already classified for our previous study (BML), in 
which  we  used  a  random  sample  of  car  owners  actually  residing  and  legitimately 
employed in Moscow for all five years 1999-2003.  We used employer identification 
numbers  and  names  and  addresses  contained  in  the  income  databases  to  retrieve 
                                                        
8 Since most of the cars with missing VINs are old and largely depreciated, the total estimated value of cars 
in  our  sample  drops  by  less  that  14  percent  as  a  result  of  eliminating  cars  with  bad  VINs.    We  also 
confirmed that retaining those cars and their owners does not affect any of the results presented below. 
9 An official for the Russian Federal Tax Service estimated that 2 out of 5 firms registered in Moscow were 
such “one-day” entities, as they are called in Russia – see http://www.delpartner.ru/?act=n&id=33.    12 
information from open sources about ownership and the sector of economic activity of all 
those employers.   
Our  classification  procedure  identified  10,179  out  of  13,263  employers  to  be 
private, non-foreign firms, 2,793 to be government agencies or state-owned firms, and 
291 to be genuine (not offshore-type) foreign-owned firms.  Given that our focus in the 
current paper is on investigating possible corporate culture spillovers between foreign-
owned firms and Russian firms related to them, we decided to add more firms that would 
be hiring workers with experience in multinationals.  For this purpose, we traced the 
movements of individuals who worked for the 291 foreign-owned employers classified in 
the previous stage, and obtained information about ownership and sector of economic 
activity for all their other employers over the five observation years.  This resulted in 
adding  1,137  more  employers,  677  of  them  Russian  private  firms,  179  government 
agencies and state-owned firms and 281 foreign-owned firms.  In the process we also 
collected some additional information about those “foreign-related” firms which will be 
used  below.    In  the  end,  the  total  number  of  distinct  employers  for  which  we  have 
information about ownership and sector of economic activity is 14,000, 10,856 of them 
private Russian firms, 2,972 government agencies/state-owned firms and 572 foreign-
owned firms.  See Appendix 3 for the details of the breakdown of the data by sectors of 
economic activity. 
The  number  of  observations  where  individuals  received  incomes  from  these 
14,000 employers amounts to roughly half of all observations in the data (13.6 million 
out of 26.9 million of all observations in the five income databases and 1,074,247 out of 
2,219,933  among  matched  observations  across  income  and  car  ownership  databases). 
Thus,  even  though  the  number  of  employers  for  which  we  have  information  about 
ownership and sector of activity is relatively small (just about 7 percent of all officially 
registered legal entities present in all five income databases), we in fact have observations 
on 50 percent or more of all legitimate (that is not shell) companies in Moscow in terms 
of employment.  Notably, more than 70 percent of employers used in this paper are 
present in all five income databases, while less than 10 percent show up in just one year 
(which in general might be a tell-tell sign of a shell company).
10 Appendix 3 contains 
                                                        
10 We checked the robustness of all the estimation results below to excluding employers with presence in  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more comparisons between employers used in our analyses and the rest of Moscow legal 
entities and discusses the representativeness of our data. 
Even though we are thus reasonably confident that the remaining data include for 
most part legitimate companies and sources of income, in the statistical analyses below 
we take some extra steps to eliminate potential problems from including car owners with 
income sources unrelated to legitimate employment.  First, we exclude observations on 
earnings that were below the official minimum wage in any given year (5-7 percent of 
observations,  depending  on  the  year).    We  also  exclude  car  owners  whose  reported 
earnings exceeded the equivalent of $100,000 in any given year (less than 0.3 percent of 
observations)  out  of  concern  that  the  link  between  earnings  and  car  values  may  be 
problematic in such cases.  Second, we examined sources of income of car owners in our 
sample and identified and eliminated individuals whose sole source of income appeared 
to be not from employment (lottery winnings, interest and dividend payments, insurance 
payments, research grants, etc.).  Third, we excluded individuals younger than 18 and 
older than 60, which is the retirement age for males in Russia (for females it is even 
lower at 55).  Our sense is that in the vast majority of the remaining cases we are looking 
at “serious” car owners whose main source of income is legitimate employment (even 
though possibly with a large fraction of “black wages”). 
3.2. Summary Statistics 
The total number of observations on car owners owning cars with valid VINs, 
excluding the bottom 20 percent (owning cars with the total market value of $1,200 or 
less) and receiving non-zero official earnings in at least one year in our data is 643,408, 
but it is reduced to 391,052 once we exclude individuals with incomes coming not from 
employment,  below  the  minimum  wage  or  above  the  equivalent  of  inflation-adjusted 
$100,000 in any given year, and those younger than 18 and older than 60.  Of these, 
186,768  observations  are  generated  in  the  private,  non-foreign  owned  firms,  188,679 
observations are generated in government employment (including government services, 
such as law enforcement, education, health care, etc.) and state-owned firms, and 15,605 
observations are generated in legitimate foreign-owned companies.  For each year, we 
                                                                                                                                                                     
only one database and confirmed that they remain qualitatively the same.   14 
also  calculated  the  percentile  of  an  individual  in  our  sample  in  the  overall  earnings 
distribution of his or her employer (which captures the relative position of the individual 
in the employer’s hierarchy) and the size of the employer by counting the total number of 
entries pertaining to its identification number.  All ruble values were converted to US 
dollars using average market exchange rates for each year and the dollar values were 
adjusted to 1999 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index. 
Table  1  presents  basic  summary  statistics.    Several  features  of  the  data 
immediately attract attention.  First, looking at car values, employees in foreign-owned 
firms have on average 5.6 percent more expensive cars than employees in private Russian 
firms.  But comparing the corresponding numbers for reported earnings, those in foreign-
owned firms exceed those in private Russian firms on average by more than 300 percent.  
The picture is similar when comparing employees of foreign-owned firms to employees 
in  government  agencies  and  state-owned  enterprises,  except  that  both  car  values  and 
reported earnings are lower in government employment than in the private sector.  As a 
result of this, the simple mean ratio of car values to income is about 75 percent lower in 
foreign-owned firms compared to other employers.  Mean car values are almost double 
the  mean  amount  of  annual  earnings  among  car  owners  employed  in  private  and 
government/state-owned sector, which makes them look unrealistically high. 
Comparing demographics, car owners in foreign-owned firms are about 4.5 years 
younger  than  those  in  Russian  private  firms  and  about  6  years  younger  than  in 
government employment.  Car owners in foreign-owned firms are also more likely to be 
female.  The percentiles in the overall earnings distribution of employers, on the other 
hand, are very similar and much above the median, indicating, not surprisingly, that car 
owners are overall more productive workers in their respective employers.  Also, the 
average size of multinationals in Moscow is relatively small, about 40 percent of the 
average size of private firms and just 8 percent the size of government agencies/state-
owned enterprises.  The fraction of car owners among multinationals’ employees is, on 
the other hand, twice as high as in government employment and about 40 percent higher 
than in private Russian firms, indicating (once again not surprisingly) that multinationals 
on average hire workers of higher productivity and also that earnings may be distributed 
less  unequally  in  multinational  employers  than  in  other  employers.    More  equal   15 
distribution of incomes in multinationals can also be seen in that the ratio of standard 
deviation to mean is lower among their car owners than among car owners employed in 
non-foreign-owned  firms  sector  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  corresponding  Gini 
coefficients (not shown). 
Significantly,  if  one  were  to  do  labor  productivity  comparisons  between 
multinationals and private Russian firms on the basis of reported earnings in Table 1, one 
would inevitably conclude that foreign-owned companies were on average 4.14 times 
more productive.  However, looking at car values, one cannot but help suspecting, even 
from  these  most  basic  summary  statistics,  that  most  of  this  observed  differential  is 
actually due to differences in transparency (a high fraction of “black wages” among non-
multinationals).  Below we put this conjecture to scrutiny in the regression framework 
and we also look at how higher transparency of multinationals affects the transparency of 
their employees before and after they work for multinationals and whether it also spreads 
to other Russian firms through the channel of labor mobility.  We begin by specifying our 
empirical estimation model in the next subsection. 
3.3. Estimation Model 
Our approach starts from the observation that it is relatively easy to misreport 
earnings, but it is very costly to drive an unregistered vehicle.
11  This difference is the key 
to our identification strategy, which employs matched administrative data on wages and 
car values to measure hidden earnings.  Specifically, we assume that employers pay a 
certain fraction of true economic earnings of their employees in “black wages,” either 
explicitly (in envelopes) or implicitly (as in cases of employee theft or side jobs using 
workplace facilities and working time). 
Specifically, let employee i’s earnings at time t working in firm j be reported in 
the amount of  , where   are true economic earnings and   is the fraction 
reported.    This  fraction  will  likely  depend  on  employer  characteristics  ,  such  as 
ownership, sector of activity, firm size, etc.  The vector S will also include indicators for 
                                                        
11 Moscow police routinely conduct traffic stops to check the paperwork. Unregistered vehicles may be 
impounded and can be recovered only after paying a fine and producing the registration document. 
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workers hired from foreign-owned companies to capture the effect of labor exchange 
with multinationals. 
The fraction   may also depend on a range of individual-specific characteristics 
, such as age, gender, position in the firm’s hierarchy and so on.  Finally, there might 
be time effects in reported earnings caused, for example, by institutional changes.  Thus, 
we consider the following specification for reported earnings: 
,   (1) 
Coefficients b are the main focus of our analysis as they measure average income 
hiding associated with different characteristics of employers S.  The more negative the 
coefficient  ,  the  larger  the  fraction  of  hidden  earnings  in  total  economic  earnings 
among individuals employed in the category of employers possessing characteristic k and 
vice versa.  The identifying assumption is that while the fraction of reported income 
depends on S, the demand for the stock of cars has the same (controlling for individual-
specific  characteristics)  functional  form  in  all  sectors.    Specifically,  we  consider  the 
following car stock demand equation: 
            (2) 
That is, the demand for the stock of cars depends on actual earnings  , individual 
characteristics  , time effects  , and an individual and time specific disturbance 
term  . 
  In  order  to  estimate  coefficients  b  associated  with  particular  employer 
characteristics  S,  we  use  equation  (2)  to  substitute  for  unobserved  actual  economic 
earnings  . 
            (3) 
where  ,  ,  and  .    Unfortunately,  in  general 
estimation of equation (3) is likely to produce biased estimates of b since car values are 
correlated with part of the error term.  However, if the value of income elasticity of 
demand   is  known,  we  can  estimate  the  relative  (non)transparency  of  earnings 
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In the empirical analysis below we employ the value of  =0.35 as estimated in 
BML using a sample of employees of foreign corporations where we have reasons to 
believe that they reported wages and salaries of their employees truthfully.
12 Most of the 
results reported below are robust to reasonable variations in the value of the parameter   
(see Section 5.2 and Table 11). 
IV. Results  
4.1. How Much More Transparent Are Multinationals? 
To evaluate exactly how much more transparent foreign corporation are in their 
labor  contracts  using  our  empirical  estimation  model,  Table  2  presents  the  results  of 
estimating regression (4) in both pooled OLS and individual fixed-effects specifications.  
We include percentile in the earnings distribution of the employer in both specifications, 
as well as age and a male dummy in the pooled OLS specification.  Both specifications 
also include observation year dummies (with the omitted year dummy being 1999). 
Our main variable of interest is the dummy equal to 1 if the company was foreign-
owned and 0 otherwise.  We also include a dummy equal to 1 if the employer was a 
government entity or a state-owned enterprise and zero otherwise.  Since other employer 
characteristics  such  as  firm  size  and  sector  of  economic  activity  may  also  affect  the 
fraction  of  economic  earnings  paid  to  employees  in  the  form  of  “black  wages,”  we 
include the (log of) the number of employees as well as 17 industry/sector dummies as 
controls,  although  to  save  space  we  report  only  a  few  coefficients  on  select  sector 
dummies  in  Table  2  (see  Appendix  3  for  the  details  of  sectors  of  economic  activity 
classification and the distribution of those sectors in our sample). 
The coefficient on the foreign ownership dummy is estimated to be 1.628 in the 
pooled OLS specification and 1.080 when controlling for individual fixed effects.  The 
effect  has  high  economic  importance:  in  the  OLS  specification,  other  things  equal, 
                                                        
12 The value of   =0.35 is also very close to estimates obtained from similar NLSY data, where income 
underreporting is presumably a non-issue.  See BML, Appendix 4 and 5 for details. 
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foreign-owned firms are estimated to report on average more than 4 times (exp(1.628) – 1 
= 4.094) higher earnings paid to their employees with the same car values than private 
Russian firms.  In the fixed-effect specification the effect is smaller at 1.945 times, but 
still large and statistically very highly significant. 
The higher transparency of foreign-owned firms comes as no surprise, of course, 
as it can be seen in the raw data in Table 1.  The regression estimates in Table 2 are also 
consistent  with  the  BML  estimates  employing  a  smaller  representative  sample  of  car 
owners with observations on non-zero earnings and car values in all 5 years.
13  
The effects of firm size and sector of economic activity are also in line with the 
BML findings.  Firm size has a statistically and (at least in the pooled OLS specification) 
economically highly significant effect on the transparency of reported earnings; labor-
intensive sectors such as trade and services as well as sectors with a lot of opportunities 
to  hide  earnings,  such  as  banking  and  finance,  are  relatively  less  transparent  than 
manufacturing, utilities and IT and communications (which is the omitted sector in Table 
2).  There is also an overall trend towards more transparency of reporting over time, 
especially pronounced between 2000-2002, which coincides with the big tax reform that 
reduced the burden of both personal income tax and the payroll tax (Gorodnichenko et al. 
[2009]).  Finally, age has a positive effect on transparency (presumably because older 
individuals  are  closer  to  retirement  age  and  are  thus  more  concerned  about  losing 
employers’ contributions to their pension fund, which is only paid out of the “white” part 
of the wages).  An individual’s position in the employer’s hierarchy (measured by his or 
her percentile in the earnings distribution of their employer) also has a positive effect on 
transparency.  Since we discussed all these findings in detail in our previous study, we do 
not repeat this discussion here but we will continue to use firm size, sector of activity and 
other employer and individual characteristics as controls whenever appropriate.  
4.2. Multinationals’ Culture of Transparency and Domestic Firms 
Since reducing the “black” component of wages and salaries and cracking down 
on employee theft and arbitrary behavior by management are important steps toward 
                                                        
13 The coefficients on foreign ownership dummy in cross-section and fixed-effect estimations in BML were 
1.487 and 1.016, respectively, on 15,492 observations.  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improving  efficiency  of  economic  transactions  (to  say  nothing  of  government  tax 
revenues), the question whether the culture of higher transparency exhibited by foreign 
corporations spreads to domestic firms is of first-order importance.  In this section, we 
focus our attention on how economic ties to multinationals affect the transparency of 
domestic  private  firms.    We  also  compare  them  to  the  effects  on  “black  wages”  in 
government employment.
14 
To  obtain  a  measure  of  ties  to  multinationals,  we  used  all  the  13,599,649 
observations  on  the  14,000  income-generating  employers  for  which  we  had  assigned 
ownership  (see  Section  III  above)  and  recorded  all  moves  by  income  recipients  (not 
necessarily  car  owners)  from  foreign-owned  firms  to  non-foreign  owned  firms  and 
entities  in  all  years  covered  by  our  data  (1999-2003).    Anyone  who  moved  from  a 
foreign-owned firm to a domestic entity once was “labeled” appropriately, and we then 
computed the ratio of the number of such workers to the total number of observations on 
individuals employed in any given domestic firm or government entity for each year.  
This  ratio  gives  us  the  firm-year  specific  fraction  of  workers  with  observed  prior 
experience  of  working  for  foreign-owned  firms  in  the  total  number  of  workers  in  a 
domestic firm, which we will call “fraction of workers with multinational experience,” or 
“multinational fraction” for short. 
Since our data window is limited to five years (1999-2003), the multinational 
fraction is by construction zero for all domestic firms in 1999.  Thus, unless the firm 
itself was founded in 2000 or later, we cannot meaningfully use the absolute magnitude 
of this fraction in our econometric analysis.
15   We can, however, use the change in the 
                                                        
14 A  priori,  it  makes  sense  to  assume  that  whatever  culture  of  transparency  exists  in  government 
employment  will  not  likely  be  affected  by  individual  workers  moving  from  foreign-owned  sector.    If, 
contrary to this expectation, we did find a significant effect on government employment, however, that 
would be a signal that our data may be capturing something other than transparency culture spillovers, so 
looking at government employment provides a robustness checks for findings in the private sector.  
15 We  did  try  estimating  a  regression  with  a  dummy  indicating  whether  a  domestic  company  hired 
somebody from a foreign-owned company or not during the period covered by our data and also using the 
fraction of such hires in a pooled OLS regression.  Neither the dummy nor the fraction (or any function of 
it) had any effect on transparency.  The results of such a regression on subsample of observations on firms 
for which we know that they were founded after 1999 are presented below.   20 
fraction of workers with experience in foreign-owned firms over time and estimate its 
effect  on  the  increase  in  transparency  of  reported  earnings  by  domestic  firms 
experiencing  such  an  increase,  while  controlling  for  employer  (and  individual)  fixed 
effects.  The results of this analysis will be presented in subsection 4.2.2 below.  Before 
that, we look for more direct evidence of corporate culture spilling over to domestic firms 
from their foreign partners utilizing information on firms’ founding background. 
4.2.1. Evidence From Firms’ Backgrounds 
As mentioned before, we assigned ownership and sector of economic activity to 
14,000 employers.  To go beyond these assignments and acquire more details about how 
the firms were founded (and when), we went to firms’ websites and other sources of 
company histories.  As a result of this, we have been able to obtain additional information 
on 2,226 non-foreign owned Russian firms about the background of their founding.  In 
particular, we learned whether foreign partners were involved from the outset (such as a 
firm being founded as a joint venture with foreign investors holding a minority share, or 
an authorized distributor of a branded foreign product, etc.).  These 2,226 employers 
cover about 40 percent of all our data on car owners.  We were also able to identify the 
year the firm was founded for about half of those firms (1,031). 
Among the 2,226 employers with known history, foreign partners were involved 
in  founding  105  firms,  99  of  which  were  private  (the  rest  were  joint  ventures  with 
Moscow city or federal governments), with about 5,000 observations in our sample.  For 
82  out  of  99  private  firms  founded  jointly  with  foreign  partners  we  were  able  to 
determine the year of founding, and in 80 percent of the cases the founding year dates 
back to the last years of communism or the very first few years of the transition (1988-
1994).  It turned out that most of these firms had long outgrown the initial circumstances 
surrounding their founding – the Russian owners often bought out foreign partners in 
former joint ventures or former distributors of foreign products long ago started their own 
production lines.  Thus, any difference in the culture of these firms and other firms during 
the  period  of  our  observation  can  indeed  be  traced  to  historical  circumstances 
surrounding their founding.   21 
In Table 3 we present the results of estimating the regression similar to (4) in four 
different specifications, with additional variables designed to capture the influence of the 
firm’s founding background on the transparency of wages it pays to its workers.  We 
exclude observations on workers who themselves had work experience in multinationals, 
so all the results pertain to employees of foreign-related companies who themselves were 
not observed working in foreign-owned firms at any point in our data.  
Specifications (1) and (2) include observations on car owners in private domestic 
companies for which we know the circumstances of their founding.  Of course, firm age 
and, more generally, the year the company was founded may also affect transparency, so 
in specification (2) we control for this non-parametrically by including 16 founding year 
dummies (from 1988 to 2003).  This also reduces the sample size as we were not able to 
identify  founding  dates  for  about  half  of  the  employers  used  in  this  estimation.    All 
specifications include all other controls as in Table 2, although we only show coefficient 
estimates on selected variables. 
As  can  be  seen  from  the  magnitude  of  the  corresponding  coefficient  in 
specification  (1),  being  founded  in  partnership  with  foreign  capital  increases  the 
transparency of a Russian domestic company on average by 71 percent.  The coefficient 
estimate is not just large in magnitude but also statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.  Adding founding year dummies reduces this coefficient just marginally although it 
is less precisely estimated, but overall the results are very similar.  This is the most direct 
evidence we have that interaction with the corporate culture of multinationals (especially 
early on) did make Russian companies significantly more transparent than their peers. 
We also check how these results hold in a broader part of the data.  For this 
purpose, we continue excluding from the estimation the companies for which we do not 
have information about how they were founded but where we also observe workers with 
prior  experience  of  working  for  multinationals  (primarily  because  we  cannot  be  sure 
whether some of these companies also had foreign partners at the time they were founded 
or  not).    But  we  include  domestic  private  firms  which  never  hired  workers  from 
multinationals during the period covered in our data (assuming that they were highly 
unlikely to have foreign partners at the time they were founded), and also foreign-owned 
firms.  In specification (3) we simply compare the transparency of income reporting in   22 
those firms where we do not observe any hires from multinationals with the sample of 
firms which do such hiring and foreign-owned firms.  The coefficient on the dummy 
capturing a non-zero multinational fraction in a domestic firm workforce is positive but 
small in magnitude and statistically barely significant. 
In specification (4) we add the dummy that captures whether the company was 
founded in partnership with foreign capital.  The coefficient on this dummy is, once again, 
economically  and  statistically  highly  significant.    In  this  larger  sample  of  employers 
(covering more than 70 percent of observations on all car owners in our sample employed 
in the Russian private sector and all observations on car owners employed by foreign 
corporations),  being  founded  in  partnership  with  foreign  capital  roughly  doubles  the 
transparency of wages and salaries.  While domestic private firms founded jointly with 
foreign capital are still way less transparent than foreign-owned firms, we can clearly see 
their position “in-between” the two cultures. 
We also utilized the limited number of observations on firms where we know the 
date of founding was between 2000 and 2003 to see how the multinational fraction we 
computed  using  our  data  (which  in  the  case  reflects  the  actual  such  fraction)  affects 
transparency of income reporting for employees in those firms that themselves did not 
come  from  multinationals.    Table  4  presents  estimation  results  in  three  different 
specifications.  In specification (1) we include only the dummy equal to one if a firm had 
a non-zero multinational fraction and zero otherwise (along with all other usual controls).  
The coefficient on this dummy in the subsample of recently founded firms is positive, 
large and statistically highly significant.  In specification (2) where we control for the 
years the companies were founded, the coefficient on the dummy for our proxy of ties to 
foreign sector is almost the same.  Finally, in specification (3) we limit the sample to only 
those firms founded between 2000-2003 which had a non-zero fraction of workers hired 
from multinationals in all years and look at the effect of the size of this fraction on 
transparency.  The coefficient on the (log of) the fraction of employees that came to 
private  domestic  firms  from  foreign-owned  firms  is  large,  even  though  the  robust 
standard errors (clustered for 71 employers in the sample) are large, so the estimates are 
not very precise.  Overall, the results presented in this section suggest that close ties to 
foreign  capital,  including  hiring  from  multinationals  at  early  stages  of  company   23 
existence, have a sizable effect on transparency.  We now turn to examining these effects 
by exploiting time variation in the fraction of hires from multinationals. 
4.2.2. Fixed Effects Estimates 
As already mentioned, for companies founded before 2000 (which comprise 99 
percent of our data on car owners employed in the Russian private sector) we cannot use 
the absolute level of the multinational fraction as a proxy for ties to the foreign sector 
because of the limited time coverage of our data.  But if we observe a domestic company 
hiring relatively more from multinationals over the five years that we have data coverage 
for (meaning that its multinational fraction, starting from zero in 1999, keeps increasing), 
that could be a sign of strengthening ties to foreign corporations.  Once we control for 
employer-fixed effects, the starting conditions prior to 1999 cancel out, and we can see if 
increases in this fraction are associated with spillovers of the culture of transparency from 
multinationals. 
There  might  also  be  unobserved  individual  characteristics,  including  but  not 
limited to different preferences for transparency that could lead certain types of workers 
to join or leave companies hiring workers from foreign corporations.  To control for this 
possible selection effect in the most general form, we conduct our estimates controlling 
for  employer  X  individual  fixed  effects  in  all  regressions  below.    We  also  limit 
observations to employees of domestic firms who had no prior working experience in 
foreign-owned firms in our data and who stayed with the same firm from the previous 
year (we call them “stayers”).  In particular, this automatically excludes all workers who 
moved from the multinationals in any given year and may have different transparency 
from their peers because of that (we look at these movers below, in Section V).  
Table 5 presents the results of estimating the following equation: 
         (5) 
In equation (5) FFj,t is the (log of) multinational fraction.  Since the regression 
includes also the log of total number of employees in the company to control for firm size, 
the coefficient on FFj,t in the log specification will be the same as on the log of the 
absolute number of workers with prior experience in a foreign-owned firm.  We also 





lnCit = f ji + FFj,t +   b Sit +   g Xit + (t)+ it  24 
its  log  (specifications  (2)  and  (5)  in  Table  5).    As  already  mentioned,  we  include 
employer  X  individual  fixed  effects  fji  to  control  for  unobserved  individual-  and 
employer-level heterogeneity.
16  All regressions include also time fixed-effects and time-
varying individual-level controls (percentile in the employer earning distribution and, in 
the first difference specifications (3) and (6), also the dummy for male gender).   
Our variable of interest is FFj,t, the estimated coefficient on which measures how 
our  proxy  for  income  reporting  transparency  changes  for  an  average  “stayer”  in  a 
domestic private company when this company hires more workers from multinationals.  
Table 5 contains separate estimates for the subsamples of employees of private and state-
owned domestic establishments (the latter category includes also government agencies).  
We also estimated the same regression in first differences. 
Estimation results in the first three columns of Table 5 indicate that an increase in 
the multinational fraction among employees in domestic private firms is associated with 
more  transparent  wages  for  stayers  in  all  specifications.    The  economic  effects  are 
sizeable.    For  instance,  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  (log  of)  the  fraction  of 
foreign  workers  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  transparency  by  about  15  percent.  
Notably, we do not find any similar evidence in the government sector (point estimates 
suggest even negative effects but are not significant). 
It is conceivable that the estimated effect of hiring more from multinationals may 
actually reflect some unobservable time-varying heterogeneity.  Obviously, we cannot 
include employer-time fixed effects in regression (5) because the fraction of hires from 
multinationals is constant for a given employer in a given year.  But we re-estimated 
regression  (5)  including  also  the  interaction  terms  between  17  sectors  of  economic 
activity and time fixed effects.  This allows us to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity 
coming from sector-specific shocks causing both hiring more from multinationals and 
increased  transparency  to  happen  concurrently.    The  results  (not  shown)  were 
qualitatively the same even after sector-specific time-varying effects were controlled for. 
It  is  also  interesting  to  see  how  increased  hiring  from  multinationals  affects 
reported incomes and car values separately.  Table 6 presents the results of estimating the 
                                                        
16 Many workers in the “stayers” category remained employed in their respective employers throughout the 
timeframe of the analysis. For them individual fixed effects absorb employer fixed effects.    25 
same regression as in (5) (with FFj,t, specified as log multinational fraction) but with the 
dependent variables being (log of) reported income and (log of) market values of cars 
separately.    Since  especially  the  adjustment  in  car  values  is  likely  to  take  time  to 
materialize,  we  show  both  the  contemporaneous  impact  and  the  impact  on  reported 
earnings and car values in the following year.
17  
In the private domestic sector both contemporaneous and future reported incomes 
of stayers tend to increase as the firm hires more workers from foreign companies.
18  But 
we do not see any effect (point estimates are even slightly negative) on car values, which 
provides  support  to  the  interpretation  that  the  effect  of  hiring  from  multinationals 
primarily works through increased transparency, at least in the short run.  Once again, the 
effects  on  both  reported  incomes  and  car  values  in  government  employment  are 
indistinguishable from zero. 
To  sum  up,  fixed-effect  estimates  confirm  the  presence  of  an  economically 
significant association between increasing ties to multinationals and wage transparency of 
stayers in private domestic companies.  In the next section we discuss some possible 
mechanisms for these “transparency spillovers.”  
V. Some Possible Mechanisms For Spillover Transmission 
5.1. Movers Between Multinationals and Domestic Firms  
In  this  section,  we  first  take  a  close  look  at  workers  who  move  between 
multinationals and private domestic firms.  A priori, there are reasons to expect these 
movers to be a select group of individuals as compared to workers who are continuously 
employed in either the foreign-owned or the domestic private sector.  For example, a 
worker  may  at  least  partly  acquire  the  culture  of  transparency  through  experience 
working for a multinational.  As several studies in similar contexts have shown (see, e.g., 
Bloom et al. [2011]), some of the “bad” practices in developing countries seem to persist, 
at least to a certain degree, simply because people cannot imagine how things can be 
                                                        
17 Unfortunately,  we  could  not  estimate  the  impact  beyond  the  second  year  because  the  sample  size 
becomes too small. 
18 The effect on future incomes is measured imprecisely because of a much smaller sample size but it is 
positive and similar in magnitude to the effect on contemporaneous incomes.   26 
done otherwise; once they are shown how it can be realistically done, many are willing to 
embrace the alternative.  Joining a Russian firm after a stint with a foreign-owned firm 
may also make the worker worry about the appearance of a sudden, unexplained drop in 
the official wage, which may draw extra scrutiny from the authorities.
19  In either case we 
would expect to observe a higher propensity to enter into relatively more transparent 
labor contracts by workers who move from multinationals to domestic firms compared to 
workers of similar productivity who have never worked for multinationals.  
On  the  other  hand,  workers  who  quit  multinationals  and  are  re-employed  by 
private Russian firms may simply be misfits in their previous foreign-owned employers.  
For instance, they may be less productive or they may try to engage in some practices 
(such as theft or moonlighting during work hours) that are tolerated in Russian firms but 
not in multinationals.  In cases like this we would expect movers from multinationals not 
to be so different in terms of transparency from their peers in Russian private firms, but 
we would expect to see them either be less productive or less transparent (or both) when 
compared with their peers who stay employed in multinationals. 
Table 7 presents some raw evidence using observations on before- and after the 
move  reported  wages,  market  car  values  and  percentiles  in  the  employer’s  earnings 
distribution (EED) of car owners who moved from foreign-owned to domestic firms (in 
the first row) and vice versa (the last row).  The other rows compare them to other 
categories of car owners  –  stayers with the same employer in a domestic private firm 
(second row in Table 7), workers who also changed employers from year t-1 to t but 
within the domestic private sector (third row), car owners who stayed with the same 
employer  in  the  foreign-owned  sector  (fourth  row)  and  car  owners  who  changed 
employers within the foreign-owned sector (fifth row). 
The data are highly suggestive.  Looking at car owners who moved from foreign-
owned to domestic private companies in the first row, we see that their reported earnings 
decline by 46 percent, but their car values actually increase by 2.4 percent.  Moving from 
a domestic to a foreign-owned company, on the other hand, results in an 82-percent 
increase in reported earnings but car values actually even slightly decline!  
                                                        
19 Websites mentioned in an earlier footnote discuss how authorities may use sudden big fluctuations in 
reported earnings to crack down on “black wages.”   27 
As a result, the ratio of car values to reported earnings among individuals who 
move from multinationals to domestic firms almost doubles and becomes statistically 
indistinguishable from the corresponding ratio among stayers in domestic companies.  
For 44 individuals for whom we had another observation in their new domestic employer, 
we also checked what happens to reported earnings and car values in the next year after 
the move.  The results (not shown) indicate that in the next year, earnings of former 
multinational employees go up by 34 percent but their car values increase by the same 
magnitude, so that the ratio of mean car values to reported earnings is unchanged.  Note 
also  that  the  percentile  in  EED  with  the  new  domestic  employer  is  higher  than  the 
percentile in EED with the previous (foreign-owned) employer (and it is even higher in 
the next year after the move for those for whom we have the third observation).  Overall, 
it does not look like movers from multinationals to domestic firms lose much in actual 
wages, despite strong evidence to the contrary in reported wages. 
It  is  also  instructive  to  compare  these  movers  with  workers  who  stay  in  the 
foreign- sector, either with the same employer (row 4 in Table 7) or changing employers 
(row 5 in Table 7).  There is no difference in terms of car values either at t-1 or at t 
between stayers in foreign-owned firms and movers to domestic private firms, but the 
movers’ reported earnings are on average just 53 percent of the stayers at t-1, when both 
are still employed in the foreign sector.  In year t, when the movers are already employed 
by domestic firms, their reported earnings are just 27 percent of those who stayed in the 
foreign sector, and the average ratio of car values to incomes is 4 times higher. 
The  evidence  in  Table  7  does  not  square  well  with  the  idea  that  an  average 
individual moving from a multinational to a domestic firm is implanted with the culture 
of transparency that he carries with him.  If anything, the emerging picture seems to be 
consistent with the interpretation that the movers quit the foreign sector (or are fired by 
their employers) because they do not embrace this culture.  This does not, however, 
immediately imply that none of them can still serve as “transmitters” of the culture of 
transparency from multinationals to domestic firms. 
To probe this issue more deeply we conduct regression analysis.  Specifically, we 







lnCit =  +  MFit +    b Sit +    g Xit +  t ( )+ it,      (6) 
where the left-hand side is our measure of transparency of income reporting as in (4), and 
S, X, and   
  
  t ( ) are, once again, vectors of controls for employer characteristics (sector of 
economic activity and log number of employees), individual characteristics (age, gender, 
percentile in EED) and year dummies representing the time trend, respectively.  The 
variable of interest is MFit, which is the dummy equal to 1 if the individual was employed 
by a foreign-owned company in year t-1 and by a domestic private company in year t.  
The regression is estimated on the same sample of individuals satisfying our usual criteria 
for both years t-1 and t (that is, in both years we exclude the bottom 20 percent of car 
values, car owners with incomes not from employment, below the minimum wage and 
above the equivalent of $100,000, younger than 18 and older than 60).
20  The coefficient 
on the variable of MFit is thus designed to capture the difference in transparency (if any) 
between movers from multinationals and stayers in domestic private companies. 
  Table 8 presents the results of estimating equation (6) on four different samples of 
domestic private firms.  In column (1) we use all available observations.  The results 
confirm the findings in the raw data – the transparency of the movers from foreign-owned 
firms is statistically and economically indistinguishable from that of “stayers.” 
In column (2) we limit the sample to employers with the overall multinational 
fraction above the 90
th percentile (corresponding to this fraction being greater or equal 
than 0.0104).  The coefficient on the dummy for being employed by a multinational in 
the previous year is statistically not significant but it is now positive and of relatively 
high magnitude.  In column (3) we further narrow down the sample to employers with the 
multinational fraction above the 99
th percentile (greater or equal than 0.0465).  Since we 
are left with just 370 observations, the coefficient on the dummy for being employed by a 
multinational in the previous year is estimated very imprecisely, but it is even much 
larger in magnitude and statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  Finally, column 
(4) uses the sample limited to private firms founded in partnership with foreign capital as 
explained in Section 3.2.1 above.  Once again, the number of observations is limited and 
                                                        
20 In  addition,  we  limit  the  sample  to  car  owners  who  either  moved  from  a  foreign-owned  firm  to  a 
domestic private employer in year t or have stayed with the same domestic private employer in both years.   29 
the coefficient is estimated imprecisely but it appears to be even larger in magnitude than 
the previous one. 
To sum up, there is little evidence of higher intrinsic (or acquired) culture of 
transparency among all workers who move from multinationals to domestic private firms 
compared  to  workers  with  no  experience  in  multinationals.    But  we  do  find  some 
evidence to this effect in select samples of employers with close ties to multinationals.  
We  next  examine  in  more  detail  the  channels  through  which  hiring  workers  from 
multinationals may affect the transparency of “stayers” in domestic private firms. 
5.2. Searching for the Mechanism: Vertical or Horizontal Transmission? 
In  section  4.2  we  found  that  an  increase  in  the  inflow  of  employees  with 
experience  in  foreign-owned  companies  is  associated  with  increased  transparency  of 
“stayers,”  i.e.,  employees  who  themselves  continue  to  be  employed  by  their  current 
domestic  private  employer  and  had  never  worked  at  a  foreign  company  within  the 
timeframe of our analysis.  In this section we consider two channels through which hiring 
of workers from multinationals might increase the transparency of such “stayers.” 
One  such  channel  is  where  a  high-ranking  employee  coming  from  a  foreign 
corporation initiates changes in operations of the domestic firm to bring it closer to the 
corporate standards of his previous (foreign-owned) employer.  In particular, this could 
involve restructuring the contracts of incumbent workers towards lower share of “black 
wages.”  Of course, the ability of a foreign newcomer to make such changes would 
crucially depend on his position in the chain of command.  Hence, under this story we 
would expect that changes in transparency will be the largest when individuals from 
multinationals are hired for top managerial positions: that is, hiring a CFO should have 
different effects than hiring a janitor.  We say that in this case, the culture of transparency 
spills over vertically from the top to the bottom of the firm’s hierarchy. 
Another possible channel is where the domestic firm engages in “benchmarking” 
of  the  following  kind.    We  found  some  partial  evidence  in the  previous  section  that 
workers  moving  from  foreign-owned  companies  tend  to  negotiate  relatively  more 
transparent contracts.  We can also see from Table 7 that the absolute level of wages and 
salaries reported by domestic private companies for recent movers from multinationals is   30 
much higher than the corresponding level of wages and salaries reported for other movers 
(not  from  multinationals),  and  it  is  also  somewhat  higher  than  those  of  the  stayers 
(especially considering that stayers are located higher in the earnings distribution of their 
employers). 
These higher incomes of movers from foreign-owned firms might translate into 
better  income  reporting  for  incumbent  employees  in  similar  jobs,  since  paying 
dramatically different “white wages” in such cases may cause disruption in the workplace.  
In this case, we say that transparency spills over horizontally, with “stayers” closer in the 
job  responsibility  space  to  a  newcomer  from  a  foreign  entity  experiencing  larger 
increases in transparency. 
To  probe  empirically  for  the  presence  of  vertical  spillovers  we  utilize  two 
measures.  First, for each company in each year we compute the maximum percentile in 
the wage distribution occupied by a person with prior working experience in a foreign-
owned company.  Second, for each “stayer” in a domestic company we create a dummy 
indicating whether there is a person with prior experience in a foreign-owned firm above 
him/her in terms of the employer earnings distribution. 
To look for the presence of horizontal spillovers, for each “stayer” in a domestic 
company we calculate his distance from the closest person who came from a foreign-
owned  firm.    We  utilized  three  measures  of  such  distance.    First,  we  compute  the 
minimum distance in the current employer wage percentiles between wages received by a 
given “stayer” and movers from foreign-owned companies.  It is possible, however, that 
earnings of employees who have just moved from foreign-owned companies might not 
reflect their true position in the firms’ hierarchy due to differences in income reporting.  
To address this possible problem, we also compute the minimum distance as above, using 
previous (foreign-owned) employer percentiles for movers.
21  
The  third  measure  we  use  is  based  on  percentiles  in  terms  of  car  values.  
Inasmuch as car values are a good proxy for true earnings, this is likely to be the most 
adequate measure, independent of any misrepresentation of reported wages that may be 
going on.  The drawback of this measure is that by construction it is defined over a much 
                                                        
21 Just like we did when computing the multinational fraction, we compute all of the above-mentioned 
measures utilizing the available data on all workers, not just car owners.   31 
smaller subsample of car owners.  Still, given the widespread presence and heterogeneity 
of  “black  wages,”  this  distance  is  our  preferred  measure  of  how  similar  actually  the 
mover from a multinational is to his or her new colleagues in the Russian firm. 
We regress our measure of the transparency of reported earnings (the elasticity-
adjusted income car gap) for the sample of “stayers,” with the above five measures of 
distance  from  their  new  colleagues  coming  from  multinationals  as  our  variables  of 
interest.  As before, to account for individual and firm level unobserved heterogeneity we 





lnCit = fi,j i ( ) + PDi,j i ( )t +gXit +  t ( )+ i,j i ( )t       (7) 
Here PD measures intensity of vertical/horizontal spillover as described above, while fj(i) 
corresponds to employer X individual fixed effects.  
Table 9 presents the results of estimating regression (7) for employees of private 
domestic companies using all five of the above measures.  Measures of vertical spillover 
have the expected (positive) sign but are not statistically significant and implied effects 
are  small.
22   Measures  of  horizontal  spillovers  have  the  expected  (negative)  sign  and 
especially the coefficient on our preferred measure, the percentile distance in market 
values of cars, is large in magnitude and statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
despite the smaller sample size.  It thus seems that “stayers” in domestic companies do 
tend to experience a larger gain in transparency if they are located closer to a mover from 
a foreign-owned company in the job quality space. 
The effects of percentile distances we find in the regressions above might simply 
reflect an increase in the overall fraction of employees with prior experience in foreign-
owned companies.  Indeed, as a company hires more employees from multinationals, the 
chances to find a mover from a foreign company nearby increase by construction for each 
individual “stayer”.  To control for this, we re-estimated regression (7) including also the 
(log of) fraction of employees with prior experience in multinationals as in Section 4.2.  
Table 10 presents estimation results.  The impact of horizontal spillovers as measured by 
percentile distance in car values is still significant and of the same magnitude.  The 
                                                        
22 E.g., an increase in top wage percentile occupied by foreign worker by 10 percentage points is associated 
with 4 percent higher earnings, with coefficient being not statistically significant.   32 
magnitude of the corresponding coefficient implies that a decrease in car value distance 
by 10 percentage points for a given “stayer” as a new employee is hired from a foreign-
owned firm is associated with an increase in transparency of income reporting also by 
about 10 percent.  Overall, the data provide some support in favor of horizontal spillovers 
in private domestic companies, especially around true earnings (proxied by car values) 
but vertical spillovers seem to be of less importance. 
5.3. Robustness Checks 
Our regressions assumed an income elasticity of demand for cars of 0.35.  In 
Table 11 we reproduce our main regressions from Table 5 using elasticities of 0.25 and 
0.45, both being more than a standard deviation below and above the benchmark estimate 
of 0.35.  The estimated coefficients are close to the benchmark specification.  A higher 
share of workers from foreign companies leads to higher transparency of earnings in 
domestic private companies but no effects are observed for state-owned establishments. 
We also restricted the sample to employers who are present in all five years in the 
sample to get rid of dying or newly found firms to see whether that affects our results.  
The basic patterns remain the same, as shown in Table 12. 
We also implemented a variety of additional robustness checks.  Since there could 
be gender differences in the demand for cars as well as in preferences for transparency, 
we re-estimated all regressions only on the sample of men and got very similar results.  
We  also  looked  at  only  workers  above  the  median  in  the  wage  distribution  of  their 
employers to restrict attention to those above a certain level of productivity.  We also 
experimented with various car value cutoffs, such as a lower cutoff of $1,000, or a higher 
cutoff where we dropped the bottom 30 percent of all car values (those below, roughly 
$1,800).  In all cases the results were similar.  Details are available upon request. 
VI. Conclusions 
We have examined the difference in corporate culture between multinationals and 
domestic  private  firms  in  the  transitional  economy  of  Russia.    Using  administrative 
records on official wages and salaries matched to car ownership data we found that in 
1999-2003 foreign-owned firms reported on average four times higher earnings of their   33 
employees  than  did  domestic  private  firms  for  the  same  car  values  and  other 
characteristics.  Thus, there is strong support in the data for the widespread perception 
that  Russian  firms  hide  a  lion’s  share  of  actual  employee  compensation.
23   One 
implication of this finding is that estimates that show foreign-owned firms to have much 
higher labor productivity than their domestic counterparts may be overstating the actual 
efficiency gap by not taking proper account of hidden earnings (and also hidden sales and 
profits) in Russian firms.   
Another implication, on which we have focused in this paper, is that there is a 
potential for foreign firms to affect positively the culture of domestic firms.  We argued 
that this could be an important channel through which foreign direct investment may 
contribute  to  improved  efficiency  of  the  recipient  economy  because  the  system  of 
unofficial  worker  compensation  (either  through  “black  wages”  or  through  implicit 
acceptance of employee theft) is still highly inefficient.  In particular, it clearly involves 
high  transaction  costs,  it  puts  unnecessary  barriers  on  labor  (and  general  resource) 
reallocation due to inherent trust problems, it deprives governments of tax revenues and 
workers of the employer contributions to the retirement fund, etc. 
Multinationals comprise a very small part of the economy of Moscow, so it is not 
surprising  that  even  though  some  of  them  had  been  operating  in  Russia  for  about  a 
decade by the time our data coverage starts, their overall influence on the culture of 
transparency was still negligible in the aggregate data.  We did find, however, that private 
Russian firms founded in partnership with foreign capital were twice as transparent in 
reporting earnings of their employees as other private Russian companies, even though 
most of them were currently entirely owned by Russian capital. 
We  also  found  rather  strong  evidence  of  a  positive  effect  on  transparency  of 
increased hiring from multinationals.  An increase in the fraction of workers hired from 
foreign corporations by one standard deviation was associated with 20 percent increase in 
the transparency of reported incomes for workers who themselves did not come from 
multinationals, controlling for employer X individual fixed-effects. 
                                                        
23 Some  foreign-owned  firms  may  also  not  be  fully  transparent.    In  particular,  the  evidence  on  the 
relationship between car values and reported earnings of individuals moving between foreign-owned and 
domestic firms (see Table 7) can perhaps be interpreted in this way.   34 
Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that there were some other time-
varying effects that caused both the fraction of hires from multinationals and the degree 
of transparency to increase concurrently in affected firms, so we cannot claim to have 
found a causal relationship between the increase in the fraction of workers hired from 
foreign-owned firms and increased transparency of domestic firms.  But we found that 
including controls for time-varying sector of economic activity effects does not change 
the results.  We also looked for evidence that transparency of Russian firms may be 
increasing  disproportionately  if  they  hired  top  executives  from  multinationals  (which 
could under some circumstances be interpreted as evidence of a deliberate decision taken 
at some point in time to increase transparency by hiring from multinationals) but we did 
not find such evidence in our data. 
Instead,  we  found  some  evidence  that  a  possible  mechanism  for  spillovers  of 
corporate  culture  from  multinationals  to  domestic  firms  may  involve  “horizontal 
spillovers,” that is, spillovers in which domestic private firms adjust officially paid wages 
and  salaries  to  incumbent  workers  who  are  positioned  similarly  to  new  hires  from 
multinationals in terms of their job responsibilities.  While the evidence is somewhat 
tentative, there is support for the notion that domestic firms that find it important to hire 
workers from multinationals for reasons not necessarily related to transparency (such as 
perhaps their skills), may as a by-product be “pushed” into becoming more transparent. 
Culture  in  general  and  corporate  culture  in  particular  is  stubborn  and  hard  to 
change.  There is no better evidence of this than the struggles of the Russian economy 
and other economies of the former Soviet Union over the 20 years that have elapsed since 
those countries bid farewell to their “socialist” system.  But we also know that eventually 
cultural changes do come about in response to economic incentives.  Foreign capital and 
especially foreign direct investment may thus play an important role in diffusing not just 
better technologies and management practices but also the culture of transparent, arms-
length transactions in recipient countries suffering from inefficient, non-transparent, and 
insider-oriented culture of doing business.  Our paper has shown that there is indeed 
some evidence of such diffusion taking place, offering a glimmer of hope for the Russian 
economy.   35 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Tables 








Car Values (C) 
 7,285.49    6,287.99    7,696.57  
 (11,995.99)    (9,604.65)    (10,028.93)  
Incomes (I) 
 3,740.15    3,058.97    15,480.11  
(6,928.51)   (4,537.65)    (15,801.55)  
Means ratio (C)/(I)   1.95    2.06    0.50  
Age 
 39.70    41.47    35.27  
 (9.82)    (9.98)    (8.91)  
Fraction Male 
 0.78    0.71    0.67  
 (0.42)    (0.45)    (0.47)  
Percentile in employer 
earning distribution 
 0.71    0.66    0.67  
 (0.24)    (0.26)    (0.25)  
Employer size (number 
of employees) 
 1,754    8,811    693  
 (4,287)    (14,886)    (1,255)  
Fraction of car owners 
in the data 
 0.14    0.10    0.20  
 (0.11)    (0.06)    (0.12)  
Number of observations   186,768    188,679    15,605  
Source:  Authors’  estimates  using  Moscow  income  and  car  registry  databases  for  1999-2003. 
Excluding car owners with market values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with incomes not from 
employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the equivalent of $100,000 in any 
given year, younger than 18 and older than 60. All values in 1999 US dollars using market 
exchange  rates  between  the  US  dollar  and  the  ruble  and  adjusted  for  inflation  using  the  US 
Consumer Price Index.   39 
Table 2. Estimates of regression (4) 
  Pooled OLS  Individual fixed-effects 
Ownership:  Private domestic is the omitted category 
Foreign ownership 
 
1.628***  1.080*** 
(0.030)  (0.053) 
State ownership 
 
0.255***  0.268*** 
(0.017)  (0.029) 
Log number employees 
 
0.184***  0.016*** 
(0.004)  (0.005) 
Select sectors of economic activity (omitted sector, IT and communications): 
Banking and finance 
 
-0.591***  -0.476*** 
(0.035)  (0.056) 
Utilities 
 
0.021  0.616*** 
-0.038  (0.090) 
Wholesale and retail trade 
 
-0.647***  -0.307*** 
(0.033)  (0.051) 
Manufacturing 
 
0.020  0.270*** 
(0.030)  (0.050) 
Services 
 
-0.395***  -0.113** 
(0.034)  (0.051) 
Age 
 
0.020***    
(0.001)    
Male dummy 
 
0.092***    
(0.014)    
Percentile in employer earnings 
distribution 
2.372***  2.591*** 
(0.021)  (0.019) 
Year dummies: omitted year 1999 
2000 
 
0.131***  0.370*** 
(0.009)  (0.008) 
2001 
 
0.482***  0.897*** 
(0.011)  (0.008) 
2002 
 
0.622***  1.220*** 
(0.012)  (0.009) 
2003 
 
0.483***  1.300*** 
(0.012)  (0.009) 
Constant 
 
-20.538***  -19.354*** 
(0.042)  (0.052) 
# of obs. (individuals)  390,644 (203,535)  390,849 (203,652) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.079  0.796 
Notes: The dependent variable is the “income-car gap”, defined as the difference between Log of 
inflation-adjusted  reported  earnings  and  inflation  and  income  elasticity-adjusted  Log  of  car 
values: logE
R  1/  logC . Pooled OLS with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, 
**,  and  *  indicate  significance  at  1  percent,  5  percent  and  10  percent  levels,  respectively. 
Excluding car owners with market values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with incomes not from 
employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the equivalent of $100,000 in any 
given year, younger than 18 and older than 60..   40 
Table 3. Transparency and founding background 
  (1)  (2)I  (3)  (4) 
Foreign partner at founding dummy 
 
0.538***  0.514**    0.721*** 
(0.184)  (0.221)    (0.195) 
Log number of employees 
 
0.177***  0.174***  0.261***  0.262*** 
(0.037)  (0.050)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Dummy for a non-zero fraction of workers 
with prior multinational experience 
    0.117*  0.091 
    (0.070)  (0.072) 
Dummy for foreign-owned firms 
 
    1.726***  1.740*** 
    (0.085)  (0.086) 
Constant 
 
-19.362***  -18.957***  -20.164***  -20.222*** 
(0.438)  (0.654)  (0.235)  (0.237) 
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Founding year dummies  No  Yes  No  No 
# of observations (employers)  60,909 (1,201)  27,350 (681)  146,094 (8,297)  146,094 (8,297) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.122  0.111  0.133  0.134 
Notes: The dependent variable is the income-car gap as defined in Table 2. Pooled OLS with robust standard errors clustered by employers in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. Excluding car owners with market 
values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with incomes not from employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the equivalent of 
$100,000 in any given year, younger than 18 and older than 60.  Other controls in all specifications include 17 dummies for sectors of economic 
activity, time fixed effects, age, age squared, gender, and percentile in the employer’s earning distribution.  Specifications I and II include only 
private domestic companies with known founding background. Specification II includes 16 dummies for years the company was founded (between 
1988 and 2003). Specifications III and IV include also observations on employers where we do not know the founding background but where we 
do not observe any workers with prior experience working for multinationals. 
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Table 4. Transparency and fraction of workers with prior experience in multinationals in firms founded after 1999 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dummy for a non-zero fraction of workers with 
prior multinational experience 
0.974***  0.875**   
(0.343)  (0.347)   
Log fraction of workers with prior 
multinational experience 
    0.541* 
    (0.293) 
Log number of employees 
 
0.368***  0.447***  0.650*** 
(0.099)  (0.150)  (0.235) 
Constant 
 
-16.034***  -16.539***  -14.946*** 
(1.471)  (2.125)  (1.980) 
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Founding year controls  No  Yes  Yes 
# of observations (employers)  1,278 (89)  1,278 (89)  1,114 (71) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.117  0.125  0.123 
Notes: The dependent variable is the income-car gap as defined in Table 2. Pooled OLS with robust standard errors clustered by employers in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. Excluding car owners with market 
values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with incomes not from employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the equivalent of 
$100,000 in any given year, younger than 18 and older than 60.  Other controls in all specifications include 17 dummies for sectors of economic 
activity, time fixed effects, age, age squared, gender, and percentile in the employer’s earning distribution.  Specifications I and II include only 
private domestic companies founded in 1999-2003. Specification II includes 4 dummies for years the company was founded (between 2000 and 
2003). Specification III limits the sample to firms that had non-zero fraction of workers with prior multinational experience.   42 
Table 5. Fraction of workers with prior experience in multinationals and the transparency of “stayers”: 
Fixed-effect estimates (regression (5)) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Variables 
LogIncCar = Log Income – 
1/λ Log Car Value  DLogIncCar 
LogIncCar = Log Income – 
1/λ Log Car Value  DLogIncCar  
Ownership  Private  Private  Private  Government  Government  Government 
Log fraction of workers with prior 
experience in FOF 
0.144**      -0.013     
(0.057)      (0.025)     
Fraction of workers with prior 
experience in FOF 
  12.246*      -38.236*   
  (6.290)      (21.949)   
First difference in log fraction 
with prior experience in FOF 
    0.089***      -0.031 
    (0.032)      (0.019) 
Log number of employees 
 
-0.203  -0.227*    0.029  0.055   
(0.132)  (0.133)    (0.056)  (0.056)   
First difference in log number of 
employees 
    0.270***      0.095*** 
    (0.071)      (0.037) 
Percentile in employer earnings 
distribution 
2.463***  2.460***  0.399***  2.536***  2.543***  0.175*** 
(0.235)  (0.235)  (0.088)  (0.122)  (0.122)  (0.052) 
Male dummy 
 
    0.216***      0.261*** 
    (0.040)      (0.024) 
Constant 
 
-15.344***  -16.134***  -0.042  -18.032***  -18.135***  0.006 
(1.001)  (0.958)  (0.095)  (0.519)  (0.497)  (0.058) 
Employer X individual FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  30,414  30,414  13,337  53,506  53,506  27,055 
R-squared  0.947  0.947  0.023  0.945  0.945  0.013 
Notes: The dependent variables are the income-car gap as defined in Table 2 and the first difference in income-car gap as described in the main 
text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Excluding car 
owners with market values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with incomes not from employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the 
equivalent of $100,000 in any given year, younger than 18 and older than 60. Sample is limited to workers with no prior experience in foreign-
owned firms employed by a given employer for two consecutive years. Specifications (1)-(3) are estimated for the sample of employees of 
domestic private companies, specifications (4)-(6) for employees of government entities and state-owned enterprises. All specifications include 
employer X individual and time fixed effects.   43 
Table 6. Fraction of workers with prior experience in multinationals and the current and future reported incomes and car values of 
“stayers”: Fixed-effect estimates (regression (5)) 

















car value t 
Log market 
car value t+1 
Ownership  Private  Private  Private  Private  Government  Government  Government  Government 
Log fraction of workers with 
prior experience in FOF at t 
0.077***  0.082  -0.023  -0.013  0.004  0.027  0.006  -0.019 
(0.018)  (0.057)  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.004)  (0.021)  (0.009)  (0.015) 
Log number of employees 
 
-0.167***  0.109  0.013  0.104  -0.020  0.079*  -0.017  0.006 
(0.042)  (0.173)  (0.045)  (0.132)  (0.014)  (0.048)  (0.019)  (0.028) 
Percentile in employer 
earnings distribution 
2.745***  0.286  0.099  -0.034  2.544***  0.419*  0.003  -0.098 
(0.096)  (0.390)  (0.076)  (0.193)  (0.046)  (0.220)  (0.039)  (0.083) 
Constant 
 
6.553***  6.884***  7.664***  7.057***  5.206***  6.355***  8.133***  7.683*** 
(0.317)  (1.189)  (0.335)  (0.928)  (0.125)  (0.432)  (0.175)  (0.260) 
Employer X individual FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  30,414  10,491  30,414  10,491  53,506  21,565  53,506  21,565 
R-squared  0.985  0.962  0.942  0.951  0.989  0.951  0.936  0.948 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Excluding car 
owners with market values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with incomes not from employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the 
equivalent of $100,000 in any given year, younger than 18 and older than 60. Sample is limited to workers with no prior experience in foreign-
owned firms employed by a given employer for two consecutive years. Specifications (1)-(4) are estimated for the sample of employees of 
domestic private companies, specifications (5)-(8) for employees of government entities and state-owned enterprises. All specifications include 
employer X individual and time fixed effects.  
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Table 7. Reported incomes, car values and percentiles in employer earnings distribution (EED) by different categories of workers. 





Number  of 
individuals 
Employer   t-1  t  t-1  t  t-1  t  t-1  t   
Foreign-owned in t-1, 
domestic in t 
 8,263    4,495    7,405    7,525   0.90  1.67   0.524    0.591    123  
 (11,310)    (9,146)    (8,696)   (10,374)        (0.273)   (0.286)    
Domestic in t-1, t 
(same employer) 
 3,498    4,403    6,790    7,175   1.94  1.63   0.734    0.741    67,588  
 (5,876)    (7,109)   (10,050)   (11,857)        (0.227)   (0.223)    
Domestic in t-1, t 
(new employer at t) 
 2,904    3,532    7,052    6,995   2.43  1.98   0.661    0.625    3,199  
 (6,250)    (7,134)   (10,682)   (10,228)        (0.264)   (0.263)    
Foreign-owned in t-1, 
t (same employer) 
 15,565    17,679    7,143    7,513   0.46  0.42   0.689    0.707    6,303  
 (14,656)   (16,398)    (8,378)    (9,559)        (0.232)   (0.229)    
Foreign-owned in t-1, 
t (new employer at t) 
 18,779    18,444    7,964    8,901   0.42  0.48   0.665    0.660    312  
 (16,185)   (16,464)    (8,635)   (10,719)        (0.230)   (0.232)    
Domestic in t-1, 
Foreign-owned in t 
 4,748    8,618    6,038    6,006   1.27  0.70   0.620    0.530    154  
 (11,444)   (11,111)    (6,266)    (6,586)        (0.282)   (0.285)    
Source: Authors’ estimates using Moscow income and car registry databases for 1999-2003. The sample is limited to car owners with at least two 
consecutive years of observation, excluding those with market values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with incomes not from employment, 
incomes below the minimum wage and above the equivalent of $100,000 in any given year, younger than 18 and older than 60. All values in 1999 
US dollars using market exchange rates between the US dollar and the ruble and adjusted for inflation using the US Consumer Price Index. 
Standard deviations in parentheses.   45 
Table 8. Estimations of regression (6) on four samples of domestic private employers 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dummy for employed by 
foreign-owned firm in t-1 
0.070  0.290  0.915*  1.679** 
(0.267)  (0.354)  (0.515)  (0.763) 
Age 
 
0.027***  0.029***  0.022  0.011 
(0.001)  (0.005)  (0.019)  (0.011) 
Male dummy 
 
0.048  -0.186  0.044  -0.211 
(0.033)  (0.113)  (0.306)  (0.260) 
Percentile in employer 
EED 
1.637***  0.854***  0.263  0.826* 
(0.055)  (0.240)  (0.631)  (0.430) 
Log number of employees 
 
0.316***  0.301***  0.716***  0.237* 
(0.008)  (0.039)  (0.142)  (0.128) 
Constant 
 
-20.362***  -19.246***  -20.321***  -16.945*** 
(0.091)  (0.410)  (1.220)  (0.874) 
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  67,504  3,877  370  1,020 
Adjusted R-squared  0.111  0.068  0.118  0.118 
Notes: The dependent variable is the income-car gap as defined in Table 2. Pooled OLS with 
robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. Excluding car owners with market values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with 
incomes not from employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the equivalent of 
$100,000 in any given year, younger than 18 and older than 60 in both t-1 and t. Sample is limited 
to workers who moved from a foreign-owned firm to a domestic private firm between t-1 and t or 
who were employed with the same domestic private firm for two consecutive years and had no 
prior  experience  in  foreign-owned  firms.  Column  II  limits  the  sample  to  employers  with  the 
overall fraction of workers with prior experience working for foreign-owned firms above the 90
th 
percentile (greater or equal than 0.0104), column III limits the sample to employers with the 
overall fraction of workers with prior experience working for foreign-owned firms above the 99
th 
percentile (greater or equal than 0.0465), column IV limits the sample to employers founded in 
partnership  with  foreign  capital  as  explained  in  Section  3.2.1.  All  specifications  include  17 
dummies for sectors of economic activity, along with time fixed effects.  
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Table 9. Estimations of regression (7): employer X individual fixed-effects 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Percentile distance  
 
-0.084          0.252 
(0.127)          (0.634) 
Percentile distance (last) 
 
  -0.151        -0.195 
  (0.126)        (0.423) 
Percentile distance (car values) 
 
    -1.106**      -1.105** 
    (0.518)      (0.544) 
Maximum percentile with a foreign 
employer 
      0.138    0.406 
      (0.108)    (0.689) 
Dummy for a mover from a foreign 
employer above 
        0.091  0.045 
        (0.066)  (0.258) 
log number employees 
 
-0.250*  -0.221  -0.151  -0.254*  -0.250*  -0.284 
(0.133)  (0.139)  (0.403)  (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.409) 
Percentile in EED 
 
2.500***  2.550***  2.576***  2.450***  2.546***  2.603*** 
(0.238)  (0.244)  (0.745)  (0.235)  (0.243)  (0.766) 
Constant 
 
-15.896***  -16.121***  -16.735***  -15.930***  -15.989***  -15.929*** 
(0.958)  (1.005)  (2.900)  (0.953)  (0.952)  (3.026) 
Observations  30,333  28,665  10,029  30,414  30,414  9,583 
R-squared  0.947  0.947  0.965  0.947  0.947  0.965 
Employer X Individual FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the income-car gap as defined in Table 2. Excluding car owners with market values of cars in the bottom 20 
percent, with incomes not from employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the equivalent of $100,000 in any given year, younger 
than 18 and older than 60. Sample is limited to those who continued employment at a given private domestic employer. “Percentile distance” is the 
difference between individual wage percentile and wage percentile of closest mover from a foreign-owned company at the current employer. 
“Percentile distance (last)” uses wage percentile at the previous (foreign-owned) employer for movers. “Percentile distance (cars)” uses percentiles 
in car values. These three are our measures of horizontal spillovers. “Maximum percentile with a foreign employer” and “Dummy for a mover 
from a foreign employer above” measure vertical spillovers. “Maximum percentile with a foreign employer” is the maximum percentile occupied 
by employee with prior working experience at a foreign-owned company in a given domestic company. “Dummy for a mover from a foreign 
employer above” is a dummy variable indicating whether for a current employee there is a mover from a foreign-owned company who is higher 
according to wage percentile in the current employer. See the main text for details. All specifications include employer X individual and time fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.   47 
Table 10. Estimations of regression (7): controlling for fraction of workers with prior experience in foreign-owned firms 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Log fraction of workers with 
prior experience in FOF 
0.139**  0.115*  0.210  0.136**  0.135**  0.039 
(0.058)  (0.061)  (0.214)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.231) 
Percentile distance  
 
-0.002           
(0.129)           
Percentile distance (last) 
 
  -0.072        -0.169 
  (0.132)        (0.430) 
Percentile distance (car 
values) 
    -1.069**      -1.083** 
    (0.512)      (0.540) 
Maximum percentile with a 
foreign employer 
      0.060    0.221 
      (0.110)    (0.446) 
Dummy for a mover from a 
foreign employer above 
        0.055  0.071 
        (0.066)  (0.244) 
Log number of employees 
 
-0.202  -0.182  -0.169  -0.207  -0.206  -0.286 
(0.133)  (0.139)  (0.404)  (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.410) 
Percentile in EED 
 
2.483***  2.528***  2.547***  2.458***  2.514***  2.638*** 
(0.238)  (0.244)  (0.744)  (0.235)  (0.243)  (0.762) 
Constant 
 
-15.384***  -15.697***  -15.336***  -15.384***  -15.429***  -15.553*** 
(0.998)  (1.050)  (3.191)  (1.001)  (1.002)  (3.198) 
Employer X Individual FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  30,333  28,665  10,029  30,414  30,414  9,600 
R-squared  0.947  0.947  0.965  0.947  0.947  0.965 
Notes: The dependent variable is the income-car gap as defined in Table 2. Excluding car owners with market values of cars in the bottom 20 
percent, with incomes not from employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the equivalent of $100,000 in any given year, younger 
than 18 and older than 60. Sample is limited to those who continued employment at a given private domestic employer. See notes to Table 9 for 
the explanation of variables. All specifications include employer X individual and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.   48 
Table 11: Robustness: Fixed-effect estimates of regression (5) with different income elasticities of the demand for the stock of cars 
Variables  Dependent variable: LogIncCar = Log Income – 1/λ Log Car Value 
Ownership  Private  Private  Private  Government  Government  Government 
Log fraction of workers with prior 
experience in FOF 
0.171**  0.144**  0.129***  -0.019  -0.013  -0.009 
(0.078)  (0.057)  (0.046)  (0.034)  (0.025)  (0.019) 
Log number of employees 
-0.217  -0.203  -0.195*  0.049  0.029  0.018 
(0.182)  (0.132)  (0.106)  (0.077)  (0.056)  (0.045) 
Percentile in employer earnings 
distribution 
2.350***  2.463***  2.526***  2.533***  2.536***  2.538*** 
(0.317)  (0.235)  (0.192)  (0.164)  (0.122)  (0.100) 
Constant 
-24.103***  -15.344***  -10.478***  -27.328***  -18.032***  -12.868*** 
(1.369)  (1.001)  (0.802)  (0.714)  (0.519)  (0.412) 
Employer X Individual FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elasticity parameter λ  0.25  0.35  0.45  0.25  0.35  0.45 
Observations  30,414  30,414  30,414  53,506  53,506  53,506 
R-squared  0.944  0.947  0.952  0.940  0.945  0.949 
Notes: The dependent variable is the income-car gap as defined in Table 2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Excluding car owners with market values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with incomes 
not from employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the equivalent of $100,000 in any given year, younger than 18 and older than 
60. Sample is limited to workers with no prior experience in foreign-owned firms employed by a given employer for two consecutive years. 
Specifications  (1)-(3)  are  estimated  for  the  sample  of  employees  of  domestic  private  companies,  specifications  (4)-(6)  for  employees  of 
government entities and state-owned enterprises. All specifications include employer X individual and time fixed effects. 
 
     49 
Table 12. Robustness: Fraction of workers with prior experience in multinationals and the transparency of “stayers”: 
Fixed-effect estimates (regression (5)) on the sample of employers present in all five databases 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Variables 
LogIncCar = Log Income – 
1/λ Log Car Value  DLogIncCar 
LogIncCar = Log Income – 
1/λ Log Car Value  DLogIncCar  
Ownership  Private  Private  Private  Government  Government  Government 
Log fraction of workers with prior 
experience in FOF 
0.114**      -0.039     
(0.058)      (0.026)     
Fraction of workers with prior 
experience in FOF 
  21.469**      -22.457   
  (10.647)      (21.476)   
First difference in log fraction 
with prior experience in FOF 
    0.068**      -0.030* 
    (0.030)      (0.016) 
Log number of employees 
 
-0.155  -0.171    0.017  0.042   
(0.137)  (0.137)    (0.057)  (0.057)   
First difference in log number of 
employees 
    0.162**      0.079*** 
    (0.077)      (0.029) 
Percentile in employer earnings 
distribution 
2.456***  2.443***  0.295***  2.488***  2.494***  0.177*** 
(0.233)  (0.233)  (0.087)  (0.125)  (0.125)  (0.046) 
Male dummy 
 
    0.170***      0.225*** 
    (0.040)      (0.020) 
Constant 
 
-14.434***  -15.130***  0.107  -16.630***  -16.533***  0.153*** 
(1.065)  (1.011)  (0.096)  (0.543)  (0.519)  (0.050) 
Employer X individual FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  27,476  27,476  12,302  58,903  58,903  31,155 
R-squared  0.947  0.947  0.017  0.952  0.952  0.011 
Notes: The dependent variables are the income-car gap as defined in Table 2 and the first difference in Income-car gap as described in the main 
text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Excluding car 
owners with market values of cars in the bottom 20 percent, with incomes not from employment, incomes below the minimum wage and above the 
equivalent of $100,000 in any given year, younger than 18 and older than 60. Sample is limited to workers with no prior experience in foreign-
owned firms employed by a given employer for two consecutive years. Specifications (1)-(4) are estimated for the sample of employees of 
domestic private companies, specifications (5)-(8) for employees of government entities and state-owned enterprises. All specifications include 




We employed two separate sets of data. 
Vehicle Registration Database, 2005: Contains the list of all recorded instances of vehicle 
registrations in Moscow as of April 2005, along with the corresponding list of owners. 
The former provides the detailed description of vehicle characteristics including model, 
make, year of manufacturing, license plate number, unique Vehicle Identifying Number 
(VIN), and the date of registration. The latter contains data on each owner’s full name, 
date of birth, residential address and passport number. Each entry in the vehicle database 
represents  an  instance  of  registration.  Repeated  registrations  of  the  same  vehicle  are 
recorded as separate entries. We therefore define continuous periods of ownership for 
each car as intervals between its consecutive registrations by distinct owners. And to find 
all relevant entries that correspond to a given car we use its VIN number. The total 
number of raw entries is 8,308,881 vehicle registrations and 8,141,122 owners. 
Administrative Databases of Income, 1999–2003: This is a collection of five separate 
databases  filed  by  all  registered  employers  (sources  of  income)  in  Moscow  for  their 
employees (recipients of income). Each database covers one year between 1999–2003. 
Individual records in all of the five files provide full names, dates of birth, personal tax 
IDs,  passport  numbers,  residential  addresses,  annual  gross  and  taxable  incomes, 
employers’ names and employers’ state-issued registration IDs. The total number of raw 
entries in each database is as follows: 8,711,103 (1999); 10,361,320 (2000); 10,019,144 
(2001); 7,029,376 (2002); 9,355,493 (2003).  
Data issues 
All datasets above appear to have originated from manually digitized paper-based records 
and that leads to the following common problems:  
Errors and missing data: A substantial number of entries contain artifacts of manual 
input: violations of the format, misspellings, typos, idiosyncratic abbreviations, missing 
data in certain fields, etc. This poses a challenge for matching entries across databases, as 
it reduces the amount and reliability of identifying information. As a result, we were not 
able to positively identify all legitimate matches, however, due to the random nature of 
imperfections  in  the  data,  we  do  not  expect  these  missing  matches  to  cause  any 
systematic bias in our estimates. 
Duplicate entries: We found that approximately 10 percent of all entries in our datasets 
are in fact virtual duplicates of some other entries contained in the same files. Some of 
them are fully identical to (and are thus indistinguishable from) the originals; the rest 
have slight modifications compared to the originals, caused usually by typos or partially 
missing data. As explained in the main text, we decided to use only those individuals for 
whom  we  had  only  one  entry  in  each  of  the  income  databases,  thus  eliminating  all 
individuals with duplicate entries (as well as those with multiple sources of income in any 
year).   51 
Detailed sample construction procedure 
We first used combinations of full name, date of birth and address to provisionally match 
individuals in income databases for different years and to their vehicle ownership records. 
We then used additional identifying information (personal tax ID, passport number, etc.) 
available in those matched records to find other matches that were not identified before. 
Finally, in our working sample we kept only the individuals that had at most one entry in 
any of the five income databases. 
In more detail, the selection procedure was as follows:  
Step 1: We started by eliminating poor quality data from all databases to increase the 
efficiency of subsequent matching. Specifically, we left out all entries that either had 
inconsistencies in full names (abbreviations, obvious typos or non-alphabetic characters), 
or lacked information on the date of birth, or address.  
Step 2: We then used the five income databases to create linking tables that established 
connections between the same individuals within each database and between each pair of 
them. This process relied on the iterative matching procedure that leveraged all individual 
identifying information found in preceding iterations when searching for other possible 
matches in subsequent iterations.  
Step 3: Based on the linking tables obtained in the previous step, we created five cross-
sections of “single-entry” individuals, separately for each of the five years from 1999-
2003. More precisely, an individual was left in the sample if (1) he or she was present 
exactly one time in the database for a given year (no other related entries in that year) and 
(2) he or she had at most one related entry in each of the remaining four databases. This 
sample, consisting of about 26.9 million observations (about 60 percent of all initial raw 
entries  in  all  5  income  databases),  was  used  to  calculate  various  employer-specific 
variables, such as the multinational fraction, used in the estimations in the main text. 
Step 4: The auto registry database was used to match owners to all of their vehicles. If an 
individual owned multiple vehicles, the market values of all such vehicles (assigned as 
explained in Appendix 2 below) were added together. We then matched car owners with 
“single-entry” individuals in each of the five income databases obtained in the previous 
step. This produced 2,913,359 matched observations on individuals who owned at least 
one car in at least one of the five years from 1999-2003 and were present in at least one 
of  the  “single-entry”  income  databases  as  explained  in  the  previous  step.  From  this 
sample of all car owners matched to their income records we constructed the sample used 
for estimation purposes by eliminating cars with missing VINs for which we could not 
determine the exact time period during which an individual owned a given car. 
Research variables 
For  each  individual  in  our  sample  we  were  able  to  directly  obtain  the  following 
information about research variables used in estimation: age (from the information about 
the date of birth), name and state-issued registration ID of the employer (income source) 
for  1999-2003;  the  amount  of  income  earned  (received)  from  the  employer  (income 
source); make, model and year of all owned cars (if any); estimated market value of all 
owned cars (if any) as imputed using the procedure explained in Appendix 2.  
In addition, we created the following research variables from the available data:    52 
Gender: Imputed from gender-specific endings of middle names, which are characteristic 
of the Russian language.  
Sector  classification  and  type  of  ownership:  We  classified  14,000  distinct  primary 
employers in our sample into 19 sectors and also assigned each of them to one of the 
three types of ownership (see Appendix 3 for more details). Namely, we checked the 
presence of sector-specific keywords (such as bank, insurance, factory, police, etc.) in 
employers’  names  to  do  the  initial  automatic  sector  assignment  and  then  manually 
assigned sectors to the employers that were left out by the script. Similarly, we used 
another list of keywords to infer the type of ownership (e. g. JSC, Ltd, State, etc.) and we 
used  the  website  http://querycom.ru/  which  provided  ownership  information  for 
companies  using  their  state-issued  registration  IDs  we  have  in  our  data.  We  then 
manually resolved all the remaining undetermined cases and also manually checked all 
companies provisionally classified as foreign-owned to determine whether it was owned 
by a western corporation or was an offshore controlled by Russian capital. 
Employer  Size:  This  was  obtained  by  counting  the  total  number  of  individuals  who 
received payments from a given employer (income source) in a given year.  
Percentile in Employer Earnings Distribution (EED): This was obtained as the percentile 
of an individual’s income in the overall earnings distribution of his/her employer in a 
given year. 
Even though all the data used by us came from the public domain, to ensure privacy we 
have purged all the individual identifying information (names, addresses, id numbers) 
after we finished the construction of the sample. All the data used in the paper (without 
individual identifying information) and our estimation codes will be available for the 
purposes of replicating our results. We can also provide the scripts used to clean the data 
and to conduct the selection/matching process described in steps 1-4 above, which can be 
employed to replicate our sample construction procedure using the original databases. 
Appendix 2. Imputation of car values 
We develop a procedure to assign prices to the vehicles owned by individuals in 
our sample. For each car, our data contain the car’s make, model and the year it was 
produced.  For  example:  “Make:  Hyundai;  Model:  Avant;  Production  year:  1999,”  or 
“Make: Jaguar; Model: XJ6; Production year: 1993.” No information on the presence of 
optional features or the vehicle’s condition is available.  Hence, we could only assign 
prices to vehicles based on the median market value of cars of the same make, model and 
year of production. The details of the procedure used to impute prices are described 
below. 
Determining used/new status 
New cars sell at a substantial premium over used cars, so accurately assigning a 
price to a vehicle requires determining whether it was purchased new or used. To do so, 
we  used  Vehicle  Identification  Numbers  (VINs)  to  search  the  Vehicle  Registration 
Database and determine the car’s date of first registry. We dropped vehicles lacking a 
valid VIN, but this affected only a relatively small number of older, low-value vehicles.   53 
We designated a car “new” if it was first registered in the year it was produced 
and in the name of the current owner. We considered a car “used” if the database showed 
prior registrations by different owners. We also considered a car “used” if either: (i) it 
was produced two or more years prior to the date of the first recorded purchase, or (ii) the 
first recorded purchase occurred after June 30
th of the year following the production year. 
This (somewhat arbitrary) rule applied to less than 5 percent of cars in our sample (these 
cars also all proved to be relatively dated and therefore heavily depreciated by the time of 
our analysis). The results are also not sensitive to dropping these cars (and their owners) 
from the sample. 
Obtaining prices  
Russia lacks an authoritative source of car price information analogous to the 
“Blue Book” in the United States. Instead, we relied upon prices listed on the two large 
auto-trading websites that were operating in Moscow during 2005 and 2006. 
The first website (www.autonet.ru) contained online sales advertisements from 
various private owners and used-car dealers in Moscow and provided information on a 
large variety of makes, models and years of production. For the majority of cars in our 
sample we were able to find multiple matching offers (often more than 10), and we took 
the median asking price as the market value of the vehicle as of 2005. We also referred to 
the second website (www.automosk.ru which is no longer operating) to collect pricing 
data on the new vehicles in our sample. Whenever we could not find a price for a given 
combination  of  make,  model,  and  production  year,  we  used  the  most  similar  model 
available. For example, for 2003 Mercedes models 200 and 200E, we used the price of 
the 2003 Mercedes model 200D. 
We  use  these  data  to  estimate  an  exponential  depreciation  rate,  as  well  as 
category-specific new-car premiums for seven classes of vehicles: 1) Luxury models, 2) 
German and Swedish cars, 3) Japanese cars, 4) American cars 5) other European (non-
German or Swedish) cars, 6) Russian cars, and 7) Korean and Chinese cars (the full 
inventory of models and category assignments is available upon request). 
To estimate category-specific new car premiums and the annual depreciation rate 
we employed the universe of about 1,043 car make/model/year prices we gathered from 
the  on-line  sites  above,  which  contained  information  for  the  same  make/model  for 
different years.  
Formally,  let 
  
Xin
st denote  the  price  of  a  car  of  make-model  i,  of  used  status, 
produced in year s, observed in year t.  We assume that this price is given by 
Xin
st = Xiexp    t  s ( )   ki + in
st { } 
where 
  
X  i is the price of a new car of make model i, 
  
 ki  is the new car premium for the 
category into which make-model i falls,    denotes the depreciation rate, and 
  
 in
st is the 
error term. Taking logs, we obtain the regression model: 
lnXin
st = lnXi   (t  s)   ki + in
st  (*) 
  We have information for the same car make/model i for different years, denote 
t*(i) the most recent year of observation for car make/model i. Denote n(i) indicator for 
whether the price  Xin
st*(i) we observed in this most recent year was for a new car (this 
implies t*(i)=s).    54 
Subtracting  lnXin
st*(i) = lnXi    k(1  D(n =1))  (t*(i) s)+ t*(i),i  from  equation 
above we get the equation: 
  lnXin
st  lnXin
st*(i) =   (t  t*(i))   kiD(n =1)+ in
st, 
which we estimate by ordinary least squares. The depreciation rate and category-specific 
new car premiums estimates are presented in Table A1.1. We also experimented with 
category-specific depreciation rates, but the results were very similar. 
 
Table A2.1. Estimated new car premium and depreciation coefficients for 
different categories of cars 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Err.  t-value  P>t 
New car premium 
     Luxury  0.353  0.019  18.69  0.000 
     Russian  0.097  0.022  4.36  0.000 
     German  0.182  0.031  5.87  0.000 
     Japanese  0.111  0.024  4.59  0.000 
     American  0.076  0.046  1.66  0.098 
     Korean/Chinese  0.026  0.037  0.69  0.489 
     European  0.180  0.039  4.64  0.000 
Depreciation for 
Each additional year   0.123  0.002  72.94  0.000 
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In this appendix we compare our data on classified part of the Moscow workforce 
with the rest of the data and also present the details of the breakdown of the sample by 
sectors of economic activity. 
As  already  mentioned  (see  Section  III  in  the  main  text),  the  total  number  of 
observations in our data after the procedure described in Appendix 1 is 26,889,790, or 
about half of all raw entries in five income-tax databases. Among these, we identified the 
observation as that on a car owner in 1,604,231 cases (6 percent of total) by positively 
matching the individual in an income-tax database with his or her vehicle in the auto 
registry. The fraction of car owners seems to be lower than the official statistics, which 
put the car ownership rate in Moscow at about 20 percent in the late 1990s – early 2000s.   55 
Partly this is no doubt due to the difficulties involved in identifying potential matches but 
since there is no reason to suspect any systematic bias coming from bad data, we think 
that we have a representative sample of car owners in Moscow that probably comprise 
about a quarter of the population. 
  As  also  mentioned  in  Section  III,  we  obtained  classification  of  employers  by 
ownership  and  sector  of  economic  activity  for  the  total  of  13,613,869  observations, 
leaving 13,290,321 observations employed by entities whose ownership and sector of 
activity we don’t know. Table A3.1 compares the number of observations on classified 
and unclassified employers sliced by the number of years for which the employer itself 
(as identified by the unique employer identification number) is present in the data. 
 
Table A3.1. Classified and unclassified employers 
Years employer observed in data 
Number of observations in the data 
Private   Government  Foreign  Unclassified 
1  190,090  151,876  11,139  955,192 
2  192,324  225,933  6,831  1,656,037 
3  444,449  422,136  23,071  3,833,991 
4  972,577  725,505  44,770  1,906,588 
5  4,479,256  5,474,071  235,441  4,938,513 
Total  6,278,696  6,999,521  321,252  13,290,321 
 
As can be seen from Table A3.1, the employers we were able to classify by their 
ownership  and  sector  of  economic  activity  not  only  comprise  more  than  half  of  all 
observations  but  they  are  also  much  more  likely  to  be  present  in  all  five  databases 
(ranging from 71.3 percent of the total for private firms to 78.2 percent for government 
entities and state-owned enterprises. Less than 3 percent of all observations on classified 
employers pertain to entities present on only one year. In contrast more than 7 percent of 
observations on unclassified employers (income-generating sources in the data) come 
from those observed in only one year and just about 37 percent survive for all five years. 
As explained in more detail in Section III of the main text, this means that we have 
successfully eliminated many paper companies that actually do not employ anybody but 
are simply a vehicle for tunneling and laundering money – a very serious problem in the 
Russian economy at the time and even today. Thus limiting the sample to only those 
employers  we  have  been  able  to  classify  actually  may  be  thought  of  increasing  the 
representativeness  of  our  estimations  inasmuch  as  we  are  interested  in  real,  not  fake 
companies and their culture of transparency. 
We  have  assigned  sectors  of  economic  activity  to  all  classified  employers  by 
looking up their information from open sources. The list of the sectors and the breakdown 
of the sample (for all observations and separately for car owners) is shown in Table A3.2. 
In  the  analysis  we  drop  observations  on  the  “other”  sector  (which  includes  the  self 
employed and employers whose sector of activity we were unable to classify even though 
we found their information and were able to determine ownership) as well as on private 
security firms (primarily because of difficulties in distinguishing real car ownership for 
consumption purposes from professionally required car ownership in this very specific 
sector of the Russian economy). We use the remaining 17 sector assignment dummies   56 
(less federal government, city and local government and law enforcement when we limit 
analysis to the private sector) in cross-section regressions to control for sector-specific 
differences in propensity to report earnings more or less transparently as well as other 
possible sector-specific factors that can affect our estimations. 
 
Table A3.2 Sectors of economic activity 










Banking, finance, insurance   1,398,132  10.27  121,368  14.93 
Federal government   311,284  2.29  30,673  3.77 
City and local government   256,657  1.89  13,683  1.68 
Law enforcement   463,501  3.40  47,743  5.87 
Higher education and research   1,420,080  10.43  75,184  9.25 
Secondary education   604,329  4.44  22,927  2.82 
Health care and medical services   905,089  6.65  47,923  5.89 
Mass media   185,151  1.36  16,451  2.02 
Construction   1,084,589  7.97  65,722  8.08 
Utilities  658,756  4.84  27,658  3.40 
Transportation   850,891  6.25  49,701  6.11 
Wholesale and retail trade   1,120,370  8.23  68,463  8.42 
Manufacturing  1,905,720  14.00  92,641  11.39 
Sports and entertainment  259,967  1.91  14,351  1.77 
Services   1,148,596  8.44  65,982  8.12 
Communications, IT   416,218  3.06  23,264  2.86 
Non-education not-for-profits   337,588  2.48  10,159  1.25 
Private security  154,137  1.13  10,356  1.27 
Other*  132,814  0.98  8,786  1.08 
*Including self employed and unknown. 